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Introduction 
 
Since the end of the Cold War the links between environment and security 
have been progressively explored. The emergence of the environment as a 
new, non-traditional, security issue was part of a larger effort for deepening 
and broadening security studies. The deepening of security allowed for 
taking into consideration actors other than the state as ‘things’ to be 
secured. The broadening allowed for the consideration of threats beyond 
those with a military nature.  
 
In this context, climate change has emerged as a factor of exacerbation of 
environmental problems, with impacts that range from the aggravation of 
resource scarcity to the disappearance of coastal areas. These negative 
effects have increasingly been gaining a status of major concern at the 
global level, being gradually viewed as a threat to security. 
 
The securitization of climate change has entered the international agenda 
generating both concerns of a militarisation of the actions regarding the 
management and mitigation of its negative effects as well as an expectation 
of effective change due to the fact that security constitutes a high politics 
matter par excellence. The different reactions to this process are explained 
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by the prediction that the securitization process will lead to a policy change 
regarding environmental issues, in general, and climate change, in particular. 
 
This dissertation specifically examines the process of securitization of climate 
change, following the Copenhagen School, and goes on to discuss the 
implications of this process, namely in terms of policy changes associated to 
climate change. Its main argument is that although climate change is at 
present a securitized issue in the realm of the European Union, extraordinary 
measures have not been adopted to address the issue. 
 
Environment and Security Nexus: Climate Change  
According to Jon Barnett, environmental security is a product of three main 
interconnected developments, namely a growth in environmental awareness 
in developed countries since the 1960s, academic critiques of the traditional 
security discourse and practices as inadequate to deal with environmental 
security risks, and a transformation in strategic circumstances marked 
particularly by the end of the Cold War (2007: 184-188). Although 
environmental security has been an important concept in security studies 
since the 1990s, it is an ambiguous concept which encompasses different 
approaches and interpretations. 
 
One of the most influential approaches is that which concentrates on the 
links between environment and conflict. This debate owes a lot to the work 
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of Thomas Homer-Dixon developed in the early 1990s, which explored 
environmental scarcities’ potential for violent conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1991; 
Homer-Dixon, 1994). Working with selected case studies, the research 
conducted by Homer-Dixon and his team on the Project on Environmental 
Change and Acute Conflict demonstrated that the degradation and depletion 
of environmental resources, population growth and unequal resource 
distribution interact to cause violent conflict (Homer-Dixon and Blitt, 1998). 
 
These findings generated a wide debate on the security implications of 
environmental problems, with the focus of the debate being centred on 
whether environmental issues should be viewed as a security threat or not, 
and, if so, how these could be incorporated into the security agenda1.  
 
Gradually, climate change has become the focus of the environment and 
security debate as it is increasingly being viewed has the most pressing 
environmental issue. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
defines climate change as a 
 
change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. 
using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the 
variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended 
period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in 
climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result 
of human activity. (IPCC, 2008: 30) 
 
                                                          
1 For further information on these debates please see: Dabelko and Dabelko (1995), 
Deudney (1990), Græger (1996) and Levy (1995). 
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Although controversy regarding this subject exists, there is a wide consensus 
that greenhouse gas emissions due to human activities are a major 
contributor to changes in climate patterns.  
 
In this dissertation, the expressions “climate change” and “global warming” 
are equally considered because they are often used to refer to the same 
phenomenon. Although it could be argued that global warming and climate 
change refer to different subjects, respectively cause and effect, they are 
used interchangeably by the considered actors. Moreover, there seems to 
have been an evolution of the concept throughout time, with the expression 
“climate change” replacing “global warming” as a result of an evolution from 
the understanding of a limited phenomenon to a more comprehensive one. 
 
Although the security implications of climate change have now been given 
considerable attention2 there is little knowledge about the mechanisms 
through which climate change is being elevated to the realm of security and 
the resulting policy implications. The application of the Copenhagen concept 
of securitization to climate change is still underexplored. However, there are 
some authors that have used the concept of securitization as an analytical 
tool to examine the politics of climate change.  
 
                                                          
2 For further information on these debates please see: Barnett and Adger (2005), Podesta 
and Ogden (2007), Pumphrey (2008) and Wallace (2009). 
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In face of a growing conceptualisation of climate change as a security issue, 
some authors draw attention to the risks of securitizing climate change. 
Focusing on the impact of climate change on human security, Ben Buckland 
(2007) supports that although securitization of climate change can be an 
appealing option given the extraordinary measures it implies, it is 
inappropriate to this issue. According to the author, securitization entails a 
militarised approach, while climate change requires a response of political 
nature.  
 
Oli Brown, Anne Hammil and Robert McLeman (2007) also identify risks in 
securitizing climate change. Basing their study in the African continent, the 
authors argue that recasting climate change as a security threat has negative 
implications, namely climate change fatigue, focus on military responses and 
the deviation of attention from existing development problems. Nevertheless, 
they acknowledge that, by placing climate change at the level of ‘high 
politics’, securitization might be able to gather convincing arguments to 
speed action on climate change, namely emissions reductions and adaptation 
measures.  
 
Hans Günter Brauch (2008) examines the process of securitization of climate 
change at the international level. The author identifies two distinct 
securitizing actors: one that emerges from a narrow national security 
perspective - the nation state; and another which materialises from a wider 
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environmental and human security perspective – the scientific community. In 
Brauch’s work prominence is given to the latter as he defines the release of 
the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007 as the turning point in the 
process of securitizing climate change. The author concludes that the 
emerging securitization process has been instrumental for mobilising public 
and private funds for a future climate regime, although, according to him, 
the adoption of extraordinary measures is still needed to respond to this 
issue. 
 
The securitization of climate change has also been analysed by Michael 
Brzoska (2008) with the aim of understanding if it fosters the adoption of 
traditional security policy measures, i.e. militarised responses. Based on the 
analysis of four studies that attempt to securitize climate change, namely by 
the Scientific Advisory Council on Global Environmental Change of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (WGBU), International Alert, the Center for 
Naval Analysis Corporation and the Center for a New American Security, 
Brzoska concludes that different conceptions of security yield different policy 
recommendations. According to the author, traditional security conceptions 
are losing their monopoly status over wider conceptions of security. The 
author questions if the ‘exceptionalism’ derived from securitization can 
assume other configurations than traditional military force, as for example 
the application of greater attention and financial resources. 
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Beyond Climate Change Securitization  
This dissertation aims at understanding the implications of climate change 
securitization, going beyond some of the literature already mentioned above. 
Although it has become accepted to talk about climate change securitization, 
it is considered essential to explain and analyse the securitization process, 
developed by the Copenhagen School (Wæver, 1995; Buzan, et al., 1998). 
The research analyses the securitization process of climate change in the 
European Union as it constitutes a major player in world security and 
environmental politics. 
 
The argument proceeds in two stages. First it is argued that climate change 
is at present a securitized issue in the realm of the European Union. In this 
stage, the research will seek to demonstrate that the process of 
securitization of climate change is confirmed in the EU by the existence of a 
securitizing move and by an acceptance of the audience. Consequently, the 
first step of this study is to examine the mechanisms that elevated climate 
change to the level of security, i.e., to analyse how climate change is being 
re-constructed as a security issue. Since the theoretical framework developed 
by the School of Copenhagen is the only one providing a structured analysis 
of the process of securitization, it becomes an essential analytical tool to 
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understand the mechanisms through which issues are moved to the sphere 
of security. 
 
The main argument is that although securitization has taken place, 
extraordinary measures have not been adopted in the climate change realm. 
Instead, what securitization created was an increase in the character of 
urgency attributed to climate change which is transforming the level of the 
response to the issue. 
 
In order to better understand the policy changes originated by the 
securitization of climate change, this dissertation will resort to Peter A. Hall 
model of policy change. Hall distinguishes three central variables usually 
involved in the policy making process, namely “the overarching goals that 
guide policy in a particular field, the techniques or policy instruments used to 
attain those goals, and the precise settings of these instruments” (Hall, 
1993: 278). Basing on these variables, he then identifies three distinct levels 
of policy change. 
 
According to Hall, a first order change occurs when the overall goals and the 
policy instruments are maintained, while the instrument settings or level are 
altered. A second order change takes place when the goals are maintained 
but both the policy instruments and its settings are changed. Both these 
changes can be seen as cases of “normal policymaking” (Hall, 1993: 279). 
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When all the three variables are altered a third order change occurs. This, 
the author claims, reflects a “paradigm shift” (Hall, 1993: 279). 
 
Using this framework, this dissertation argues that the adoption of 
extraordinary measures regarding climate change would entail a paradigm 
shift, i.e. a third order change. Nevertheless, climate change securitization in 
the EU has originated a first order change in policy as both the overall goals 
and the policy instruments to attain those goals remained unaltered. What 
changed with securitization were the precise settings of the policy 
instruments. Hence, the security implications of climate change are being 
dealt within the realm of normal politics, and not extraordinary measures. 
 
Methodological Considerations 
Using the European Union as a case-study, the research seeks to 
demonstrate that a process of securitization of climate change has taken 
place and that this process has not led to the adoption of extraordinary 
measures. Hence, the research is developed in two distinct but 
interconnected moments. First, the dynamics of the securitization of climate 
change in the EU are analysed. In this phase, the securitizing move 
performed by the European institutions and individual member states 
(securitizing actors) is examined through discourse and report analysis.  
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Subsequently, the acceptance by the European public opinion (audience) is 
assessed through the analysis of opinion studies and the media here 
considered as able of transmitting the audience’s level of acceptance of the 
securitizing move. The media analysis comprehends relevant climate related 
news, extracted from nine newspapers with distinct political backgrounds. 
The selected newspapers are based in three different states, namely France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom. 
  
In the second phase of research, the measures defined for tackling climate 
change are analysed. In this phase, the measures proposed by the 
securitizing actors in their reports and resolutions are examined. Then, the 
main instruments regarding climate change in the EU are addressed through 
the analysis of reports, plans of action, political directives and legislation.  
 
The dissertation starts by presenting and analysing theoretically the process 
of securitization developed by the Copenhagen authors, in order to clarify the 
actors, dynamics and mechanism involved in the process. It then applies the 
previous chapter’s framework to the process of climate change securitization 
in the European Union. Chapter three finally addresses the measures defined 
and adopted to tackle climate change, analysing them through the 
securitization lenses and examining the policy implications of those 
measures. The last chapter presents some concluding remarks and potential 
future questions to be researched. 
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The Process of Securitization 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the conceptual framework of the 
Copenhagen School’s concept of ‘securitization’. It first examines the 
Copenhagen School’s position within International Security Studies. Then, it 
addresses specifically the process of securitization evidencing its actors and 
mechanisms. Finally, it addresses some of the critiques directed towards the 
concept of securitization. 
 
International Security Studies 
International Security Studies have generally been grouped along two main 
strands. The first group encompasses the Traditional Approaches to Security, 
whose main common characteristic is the focus on the state as the central 
security actor. Both Realism and Liberalism, the most influential traditional 
theoretical perspectives on security, focus on security relations among states 
(Morgan, 2007: 15). Despite other recognized convergences, such as the 
centrality of anarchy in the analysis and the positivist stance, there are 
cleavages between the two traditional approaches to security. 
 
The Realist perspective’s focal point is anarchy. The anarchic character of the 
international system is what determines states’ actions. Therefore, the 
pressures and constraints of the system are major factors determining states’ 
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security goals and relations (Morgan, 2007: 17). Another major feature of 
the Realist perspective is its view of the system as inherently insecure, which 
leads states to compete for security, through military power enhancement. 
This competition is seen to produce security dilemmas, a term coined by 
John Herz that describes the situation where an expansion in one state’s 
military capabilities, in order to increase its security, decreases the security of 
other states (Jervis, 1992: 146). In response, the latter expand their military 
capabilities as well, thus generating a vicious cycle (Waltz, 1979: 86). 
 
The Liberal perspective is more flexible regarding the impact of anarchy on 
state behaviour, acknowledging that cooperation is possible. Thus, the 
security dilemma can be overcome, because cooperation can lead 
communities to develop high levels of security. The Liberal approach is also 
more flexible regarding who are the actors of security, admitting the 
relevance of non-state actors (Morgan, 2007: 29).  
 
The second group, commonly labelled as Critical Security Studies, cannot be 
considered a coherent approach to security. Rather it refers to a set of 
approaches from a wide range of theoretical perspectives that have in 
common the challenge they pose to the traditional views of security 
(Mutimer, 2007: 54). These critical perspectives question the state as the 
only referent object for security and the focus on military security. Their 
focus is on people as referent objects for security and on the possibility of 
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non-military threats to security. Another characteristic considerably common 
to these perspectives is their critique to the positivist assumption (Mutimer, 
2007: 60).  
 
Although generally included in Critical Security Studies, the Copenhagen 
authors explicitly distance themselves from this approach (Buzan et al., 
1998: 34). Although Buzan et al. recognise they share theoretical premises 
with Critical Security Studies, such as the social constructions of security, 
they argue the two approaches are distinct. In the authors’ view, Critical 
Security Studies focuses on the possibility of change while the Copenhagen 
approach believes “even the socially constituted is often sedimented as 
structure and becomes so relatively stable as practice that one must do 
analysis on the basis that it continues (…)” (Buzan et al., 1998: 35). 
 
The Copenhagen authors also distance themselves from the focus on the 
individual as referent object for security, characteristic of Critical Security 
Studies. Rather than on individuals, the focus of the Copenhagen School is 
on collectivities (Buzan et al., 1998: 35). The authors claim that “[a]ltough 
[their] philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in 
holding security to always be a political construction (…) in [their] purposes 
they are closer to traditional security studies (…)” (Buzan et al., 1998: 35). 
By this, they mean the Copenhagen focus is on existing security actors and 
their actions, rather than on attempting to contest those actors.  
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Securitization Theory 
The most important innovation brought by the Copenhagen School was the 
possibility to understand the mechanisms of securitization while keeping a 
distance from security (Buzan et al., 1998: 35). This is to say that, instead of 
trying to understand what should be real security or what constitute real 
threats, the Copenhagen authors focus on the mechanisms through which 
issues become security issues. This is a distinctive feature of the Copenhagen 
School’s theoretical proposal as neither the traditional nor the critical 
approaches explain this process.  
 
The securitization approach thus aims at explaining the mechanisms through 
which issues are elevated to the security level and its policy implications. The 
idea of securitization was first articulated by Ole Wæver in the late 1980s 
(Wæver, 1989) and then further developed by himself in Securitization and 
Desecuritization (1995) and in collaboration with Barry Buzan and Jaap de 
Wilde in Security: a New Framework for Analysis (1998).  
 
The authors propose a spectrum along which public issues can be located 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24). On one end, we find non-politicised issues, 
issues that states do not deal with and which are not part of the public 
debate and decision-making process. At the centre of the spectrum, 
politicized issues refer to those which are part of the public policy sphere, 
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requiring government decision and resource allocation. Finally, on the other 
end of the spectrum, we find securitized issues, which are presented as an 
existential threat, thus calling for emergency measures and justifying actions 
outside the normal boundaries of political practice. 
 
 
Figure 1: Securitization spectrum  
Source: Emmers (2007: 112) 
 
Securitization occurs when an issue is successfully moved from the politicised 
to the securitized end of the spectrum. Thus, a case of securitization occurs 
when a securitizing actor uses rhetoric of an existential threat and takes an 
issue out of what is considered “normal politics” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). 
Securitization is thus seen as “the move that takes politics beyond the 
established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of 
politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). 
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Nevertheless, the authors warn that “a discourse that takes the form of 
presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not 
by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move” (Buzan et al., 
1998: 25, italics in the original). For an issue to be securitized, it is essential 
that an audience accepts it as such. Buzan et al. state 
 
We do not push the demand so high as to say that emergency 
measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to 
be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be 
made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures 
or other steps that would not have been possible had the 
discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no 
return, and necessity. (Buzan et al., 1998: 25) 
 
In fact, what they propose is a two-stage process. First, the securitizing 
actor/s perform/s a securitizing move and then the relevant audience accepts 
it, allowing extraordinary measures to be adopted or even imposed (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 25).  
 
Drawing on language theory, the authors see the process of securitization as 
a speech act. According to the speech act perspective, a statement can be 
an act in itself, i.e. “by saying words something is done” (Buzan et al., 1998: 
26). However, the authors call attention to the fact that 
 
the security speech act is not defined by uttering the word security. 
What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring 
emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that 
designation by a significant audience. There will be instances in which 
the word security appears without this logic and other cases that 
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operate according to that logic with only a metaphorical security 
reference. (Buzan et al., 1998: 27) 
 
This being said, the authors define what can be study: “[w]ho can ‘do’ or 
‘speak’ security successfully, on what issues, under what conditions, and with 
what effects” (Buzan et al., 1998: 27). Their claim is that it is possible to 
discover a characteristic pattern with an inner logic by exploring the practice 
connected to this concept of security (Buzan et al., 1998: 27).  
 
Buzan et al. identify facilitating conditions, i.e. conditions under which the 
speech act is more likely to succeed. Such conditions fall into two categories 
that combine in a successful speech act: the internal, linguistic-grammatical, 
and the external, contextual and social (1998: 32). The authors argue that 
the most important internal condition to the speech act is “to follow the 
security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes 
existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” (Buzan et al., 
1998: 33). 
 
As to the external aspect of the speech act, the authors identify two central 
conditions. One is the position of authority of the securitizing actor. 
According to this condition, the relationship of the audience with who speaks 
security determines the acceptance of the claims made in a securitizing 
effort. The other external condition identified by the authors refers the 
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“features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization” 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 33). 
 
The authors are aware that the speech-act approach to security raises 
questions about the relationship between actors and analysts in the 
definition and understanding of the security agenda. Regarding this subject, 
they admit analysts unavoidably play a role in the construction or 
deconstruction of security issues. However, it is the political actor that 
designates what constitutes a security issue. The analysts’ task is to interpret 
political actors’ actions and verify if these fulfil the security criteria, 
understand whether the actor is effective in mobilising support and, 
consequently, assess the effects of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998: 33-34). 
 
By saying this, the authors make clear that the decision of what should be 
handled as an existential threat comes from a political actor. But a role of 
critical assessment is reserved for the analyst. In fact, the authors argue that 
“one of the purposes of this [securitization] approach should be that it 
becomes possible to evaluate whether one finds it good or bad to securitize a 
certain issue” (Buzan et al., 1998: 34), this is to say, whether an issue is 
better handled in the security realm or within normal politics (Buzan et al., 
1998: 34). As the authors put it 
 
the securitization perspective, which basically removes the 
objective ground from the dominant discourse, opens the 
possibility of problematizing both actual securitization and the 
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absence of securitization, but it cannot do so by proving that 
something “is” a security problem (…) What one can add are 
arguments about the likely effects. One can try to show the 
effects of either excessive securitization – security dilemmas – or 
of not securitizing – the inability to handle an issue effectively 
unless it is securitized. (Buzan et al., 1998: 40) 
 
At this point it is relevant to enunciate the three types of units involved in a 
securitization process. Firstly, referent objects are defined as “things that are 
seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to 
survival” (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). Secondly, securitizing actors are “actors 
who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – 
existentially threatened” (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). Finally, functional actors 
are defined as those who affect the dynamics of a specific sector significantly 
influencing security decisions (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). 
 
The securitizing actors are those who argue for the necessity of defending 
referent objects, and not their own individual survival. Thus, “[a] securitizing 
actor is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act” (Buzan 
et al., 1998: 40). The authors identify common actors for this role as being 
political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 40). Buzan et al. argue that identifying actors 
 
involves a level-of-analysis problem: the same event can be 
attributed to different levels (individual, bureaucracies, or state, 
for instance). Unlike the case with the referent object, a speech 
act is often not self-defining in terms of who or what speaks, and 
the designation “actor” is thus in some sense arbitrary. (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 40) 
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Regarding this subject, the authors argue that disaggregating colectivities is 
not helpful and assume a methodological collectivism approach, according to 
which “much of social life is understandable only when collectivities are seen 
as more than the sum of their ‘members’ and are treated as social realities” 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 40). Consequently, they suggest that to identify the 
securitizing actor, it is necessary to understand the logic that shapes the 
action instead of who performs the speech. Hence, “[f]ocusing on the 
organisational logic of the speech act is (…) the best way to identify who or 
what is the securitizing actor” (Buzan et al., 1998: 41). 
 
On the subject of the referent objects, the authors argue that the 
securitization approach opens the possibility for considering other than the 
traditional state or nation. Although recognising that, in principle, securitizing 
actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object, the authors 
stress that, in practice, the constraints of facilitating conditions influence the 
success of some types of referent objects over others (Buzan et al., 1998: 
36). 
 
Size or scale is a crucial variable in determining successful referent objects of 
security. On the one hand, the authors argue that “individuals and small 
groups can seldom establish wide security legitimacy in their own right” 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 36). On the other hand, the system level also presents 
problems in establishing security legitimacy. For the Copenhagen authors, 
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the middle scale of limited collectivities has proven the most favourable to 
securitization. Attempting to explain this, the authors argue that limited 
collectivities such as states, nations and even civilisations “engage in self-
reinforcing rivalries with other limited collectivities, and such interaction 
strengthens their ‘we’ feeling” (Buzan et al. 1998: 36-37). 
 
Although considering the state an ideal security actor, Buzan et al. argue 
security is not only about the state (1998: 37). They thus constructed a wide 
conceptual net which allows other actors to be considered. Nevertheless, the 
authors stress security is not equally available to all actors. Rather, they 
perceive security as an arena of competing actors in which the state is still 
the privileged one. Hence, they recognise security is “a state-dominated 
field”, but refuse a state-centric approach (Buzan et al., 1998: 37). 
 
The securitization framework proposed by the Copenhagen School allows 
broadening the security agenda, although it attempts to accomplish it in a 
specific way. In “Securitization and Desecuritization”, Wæver distanced his 
approach from the then ongoing redefining security debate, which in his view 
tended to cancel out the specific field of security (1995: 50). For Wæver, 
those who were attempting to radically rethink the concept of security 
generally reduced the concept to its everyday sense, “which is only a 
semantic identity, not the concept of security” (Wæver, 1995: 50, italics in 
the original). 
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Weaver then proposed working from inside the traditional approach of 
security in order to take the concepts of national security, threat, and 
sovereignty, and demonstrate how, when applied to the collective level, they 
assume new forms (1995:51). He argued this would make it possible to 
remove the excessive focus on military matters from the classical approach 
by applying the same logic to other sectors. Subsequently, the discussion 
could be detached from the state by applying similar moves to society 
(Weaver, 1995:51). 
 
In Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Buzan et al. draw attention to 
what they consider the distinguishing feature of securitization: a specific 
rhetorical structure (1998: 26). This definition, they believe, allows to finding 
security actors and phenomena in sectors other than the military-political 
one. They argue that if survival of collective units and principles is placed as 
the defining core of security studies, then there is a basis for applying 
security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality of 
the concept (Buzan et al., 1998: 27). 
 
They bring to light the possibility of securitization to be either ad hoc or 
institutionalised, depending on the characteristics of threats (Buzan et al., 
1998: 27). Whereas the response and sense of urgency for persistent or 
recurrent threats usually become institutionalised, in the sectors where 
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threats are new or controversial regarding their urgency, institutions do not 
exist yet. As a result, the securitizing actors attempting to securitize the 
latter threats operate in a context dominated by security institutions 
designed for other types of threats (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). 
 
For the Copenhagen authors, security is negative as it represents a failure to 
deal with issues at the political level. For this reason, issues should 
preferably be dealt through routine procedures without extraordinary 
elevation of threats (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). They believe threats are often 
exploited for domestic purposes under the pretext of “national security”. 
 
According to this logic, Buzan et al. acknowledge that securitization has 
“tactical attractions”. Nevertheless, they argue “desecuritization is the 
optimal long-range option”, because it takes issues out of a threat-defence 
sequence and places them at the political level (1998: 29). The authors 
argue 
  
[a]lthough in one sense securitization is a further intensification of 
politicization (thus usually making an even stronger role for the 
state), in another sense it is opposed to politicization. Politicization 
means to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, 
something that is decided upon and that therefore entails 
responsibility, in contrast to issues that either could not be 
different (laws of nature) or should not be put under political 
control (…). By contrast, securitization on the international level 
(although often not on the domestic one) means to present an 
issue as urgent and existential, and so important that it should not 
be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt 
with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues. (Buzan et al., 
1998: 29) 
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Regarding this issue, in Securitization and Desecuritization, Wæver argues 
that security and insecurity do not constitute a binary opposition, as 
generally believed (1995: 56). ‘Security’ refers to a situation where a security 
problem exists but measures are taken to respond to it. ‘Insecurity’, on the 
other hand, means there is a security problem to which there is no response. 
Consequently, both circumstances share the security problématique. Because 
of the incorrect view of security and insecurity as binary opposites, Wæver 
critiques the assumption that security is a goal to be maximised, 
“eliminat[ing] other, potentially more useful, ways of conceptualizing the 
problems being addressed” (Wæver, 1995: 57). 
 
Last, but not least, another distinctive feature of the Copenhagen School is 
its intersubjective view of the securitization process. Confronting two possible 
approaches of security – an objective approach which deals with the veracity 
of threat and a subjective approach which addresses the perception of 
threats – Buzan et al. conclude that neither of them is fully adequate (1998: 
30). They reject the objective approach because they find overly complex to 
measure whether an issue is ‘really’ a threat (Buzan et al., 1998: 30). 
Moreover, the authors argue 
 
it is neither politically nor analytically helpful to try to define “real 
security” outside of the world of politics and to teach the actors to 
understand the term correctly. (…) It is more relevant to grasp the 
processes and dynamics of securitization, because if one knows 
who can “do” security on what issue and under what conditions, it 
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will sometimes be possible to maneuver the interaction among 
actors and thereby curb security dilemmas. (Buzan et al., 1998: 
31) 
 
However, the label “subjective” does not convince them as adequate either. 
Because individuals do not decide alone whether an issue is security, 
securitization should be seen as intersubjective and socially constructed 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 31). Since the success of securitization is not decided by 
the securitizing actor but by the audience, the Copenhagen authors argue 
that “security (as with all politics) ultimately rests neither with the objects 
not with the subjects but among the subjects” (Buzan et al., 1998: 31, 
emphasis in the original). 
 
Critical Voices 
Although recognised as a useful framework, securitization is far from being 
an uncontroversial concept. Several authors have drawn attention to some of 
its shortcomings.  
 
Olaf F. Knudsen, for instance, challenges what he considers a misleading 
conception of threat in the securitization approach. He claims that by 
emphasising subjectivity, securitization disregards an independent existence 
of what is perceived as a threat, thus treating as unimportant whether states 
really face dangers (Knudsen, 2001: 359). It is true that the Copenhagen 
authors reject an objectivist approach but they do so because they claim no 
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objective measure of what constitutes a real threat exists. Furthermore, 
Knudsen insinuates that the securitization concept has influenced research 
that aims at placing new issues on the political agenda (Knudsen, 2001: 
360). However, this is not to blame on the securitization approach. The 
Copenhagen authors make it clear that the role of the analyst is not to 
designate what constitutes a security issue but to interpret political actors’ 
actions. 
 
Holger Stritzel (2007) is yet another critic of the Copenhagen School, 
pointing out internal contradictions in the argument and the utilisation of 
vague and under-theorised terminology of securitization that hinder empirical 
studies. Stritzel argues that the central concepts of securitization, namely 
speech act, actor and audience, are not defined clearly. Furthermore, the 
mechanisms through which these concepts interact are also unclear (2007: 
363). Thierry Balzacq, also points out that although the audience is a central 
feature of the securitization framework, “the nature and status of that 
audience remains unaccounted for” (Balzacq, 2005: 173). Although these are 
all relevant remarks, the fact that such concepts are not precisely defined 
also gives the analyst the possibility to determine the actors and interactions 
on a contextual basis. 
 
In addition, Matt McDonald has stressed that securitization’s narrow focus on 
the discursive positioning of threats disregards the historical and social 
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contexts in which designations of threat become possible, and the question 
of how particular voices are empowered or marginalised in speaking security 
(McDonald, 2008: 580). Clearly the Copenhagen School gives emphasis to 
the discursive feature of the construction of threats. However it can be 
argued that the historical and social contexts that make possible the 
designations of threats are not fully disregarded by the framework. These 
contexts are linked to the external facilitating conditions of securitization. 
Both historical and social contexts have an influence in the perception of 
threats and in determining who holds the authority to speak security. 
 
Yet another critic, Michael C. Williams (2003), has argued that the 
Copenhagen School’s narrow focus on speech-acts is being increasingly 
challenged by the impact of images in security relations. Williams considers 
that concentrating on strictly linguistic-discursive forms discounts other kinds 
of acts and contexts that contribute to securitization (2003: 525). Although 
the securitization framework could benefit from a reformulation to account 
for these developments in a more explicit manner, one can argue that the 
framework is flexible enough to account for these forms of communication. 
The Copenhagen authors clearly state that the security speech act is not 
defined by uttering the word security. They admit that the reference to 
security can be only metaphorical (Buzan et al., 1998: 27). This could well 
include the role of images. 
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As any other theory, the securitization approach is not exempt from 
contestation. Nevertheless, the securitization framework constitutes an 
essential tool in the understanding of how issues become security issues, or 
as Wæver puts it, “[w]hat really makes something a security problem” 
(Wæver, 1995: 54). Particularly when one is dealing with non-traditional 
security issues, as is the case of climate change, the securitization framework 
is essential to understand the mechanisms through which these issues 
reached the security agenda. 
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Climate Change Securitization in the EU 
 
Although the global objective of this dissertation is to examine the 
consequences of climate change securitization in the European Union (EU), it 
is considered fundamental to demonstrate how this process is taking place. 
Consequently, this chapter focuses exactly on the EU securitization process 
of climate change. A language of security has pervaded the speech on 
climate change as a number of actors from the political, academic and public 
spheres are classifying climate change as a threat to security. 
 
Moreover, the term securitization has become a constant in everyday 
language, without any concern for the scientific or theoretical meaning of the 
term or of its implications. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to 
understand if the language of security used in the EU to address climate 
change indicates an actual securitization of the issue, à la Copenhagen, or if 
it is merely an appropriation of this language and its use has become banal 
and non-purposeful, in the Copenhagen sense. 
 
The chapter starts by defining the referent object and goes on to analysing 
the securitizing move, performed by the securitizing actors with the objective 
of securing the referent object. The referent object is the European people 
standards of living and the stability of the EU itself which is being threatened 
by climate change. The securitizing actors here considered are the European 
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institutions and its member states, at the bureaucratic and governmental 
levels, as well as pressure groups and lobbyists, at the non-governmental 
level. In a second moment, the acceptance by the relevant audience, the 
European public opinion, is examined. 
 
Referent Object 
As discussed previously, referent objects are things that are seen to be 
existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival. The 
environment-security debate might suggest that environment is the referent 
object of security, after all, disruption of ecosystems, loss of biodiversity, 
desertification, deforestation, disruption of the global water cycle, pollution 
and depletion of the ozone layer, all represent threats to the natural 
environment. Nevertheless, these threats to the environment are only 
perceived as important as they pose a risk to human existence on the planet. 
 
With respect to this, Buzan et al. stress that the preservation of existing 
levels of civilisation is the predominant concern in much of the debate 
around environment and security (1998: 75). This is because the above 
identified threats to the environment also constitute a threat to human living 
standards. This leads Buzan et al. to conclude that “the ultimate referent 
object of environmental security is the risk of losing achieved levels of 
civilization  (…) while apparently being able to prevent doing so” (1998: 75, 
italics in the original). 
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Although the EU recognises the environment, or the global ecosystem, as 
something to be protected, it is reasonable to say that most securitizing 
moves aim at securing the standards of living of the European people and 
the stability of the EU itself. As it is explained below, the EU’s main concern 
are climate change impacts in international stability, world economy, energy 
security and migratory pressures. In the EU’s perspective, European interests 
are affected by climate change, which will not only affect the natural 
environment but also sections of European society and economy (European 
Commission, 2008: 3). 
 
Securitizing Actors 
In order to understand how climate change is increasingly being identified as 
a threat to European security and stability (referent object), it is necessary to 
study the two-stage process of securitization proposed by Buzan et al.. The 
first stage of the process, the securitizing move, is characterised by the use 
of existential threat rhetoric by a securitizing actor. They define ‘securitizing 
actor’ as someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act, with 
common players in this role being political leaders, bureaucracies, 
governments, lobbyists and pressure groups (Buzan et al., 1998: 40).  
 
In the case of the EU, the main securitizing actors, at the bureaucratic and 
governmental levels, are the European institutions, namely the European 
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Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union, also some member states, specifically the United Kingdom, Germany 
and France. At the non-governmental level, pressure groups have also acted 
as securitizing actors, most prominently the Oxford Research Group, the 
Royal United Services Institute, International Alert and Oxfam International. 
These institutions have been increasingly using rhetoric of security to 
address climate change. 
 
European Union Institutions 
In 2003, the European Council, held in Brussels, approved A Secure Europe 
in a Better World - The European Security Strategy, which was drafted under 
the auspices of the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, Javier Solana. Although it does not include climate change in 
its key security threats, the document already identifies global warming as an 
alarming element: “competition for natural resources - notably water - which 
will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to 
create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions” 
(European Council, 2003: 3). The document states that “it is a condition of a 
rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments 
such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming” (European Council, 
2003: 10). 
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It was only in 2008 that the Report on the Implementation of the European 
Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World, adopted by the 
European Council, finally added climate change to the list of key threats to 
security (European Council, 2008: 5). The Report states “in 2003, the ESS 
[European Security Strategy] already identified the security implications of 
climate change. Five years on, this has taken on a new urgency” (European 
Council, 2008: 5). According to the Report, 
 
[n]atural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for 
resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty 
and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and 
security consequences, including greater migration. Climate 
change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime 
zones and resources previously inaccessible. (European Council, 
2008: 5) 
  
The report identifies effective multilateralism as essential to respond to the 
changing security environment. In this context, it identifies climate change as 
a key priority in international multilateral negotiations, with the objective of 
reaching a new and ambitious international agreement on climate change 
(European Council, 2008: 12). 
 
This evolution in the significance of climate change in the European Security 
Strategy was stimulated by the joint report of the EU High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission to 
the European Council, entitled Climate Change and International Security. 
This report, published in March 2008, addresses the impact of climate 
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change on international security, arguing that it “is not a problem of the 
future but already of today and one which will stay with us”  (European 
Commission, 2008a: 8).  
 
It depicts climate change as “a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing 
trends, tensions and instability” (European Commission, 2008: 2). For both 
the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
European Commission, the risks posed by climate change are not merely of a 
humanitarian nature, “they also include political and security risks that 
directly affect European interests” (European Commission, 2008: 2). 
 
These risks are clearly identified in the report as conflicts over resources, 
negative economic impacts, risks to coastal cities and infrastructures, loss of 
territory and border disputes, environmentally-induced migratory 
movements, political and social fragility, tensions over energy supplies and 
pressures on international governance (European Commission, 2008: 3-5). 
Moreover, the Climate Change and International Security Report argues that 
addressing climate change entails a preventive security policy. It states that 
 
[i]nvestment in mitigation (…) as well as ways to adapt to the 
unavoidable should go hand in hand with addressing the 
international security threats created by climate change; both 
should be viewed as part of preventive security policy. (European 
Commission, 2008: 1) 
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According to the conclusions of the High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and the Commission, “it is in Europe's self 
interest to address the security implications of climate change with a series 
of measures: at the level of the EU, in bilateral relations and at the 
multilateral level, in mutually supportive ways” (Commission, 2008: 3). The 
joint Report recommends that different dimensions should be addressed in 
order to build a comprehensive and effective response to the impact of 
climate change on international security. 
 
Drawing on the conclusions of the joint Report, the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) Newsletter, published by the Council of the European 
Union, dedicated a section to climate change in its Issue of July 6, 2008. 
Under the headline “Creating a climate of security”, the section addresses 
the security implications of climate change, warning that climate change is 
not purely an environmental issue, “it also poses significant global security 
challenges which are of major concern to the EU” (Council of the European 
Union, 2008b: 21). It is argued that “global warming is already having a 
profound impact on international security, as individuals and states scramble 
for diminishing resources” (Council of the European Union, 2008b: 21) and 
suggested that “it is imperative that Europe and the world adopt a preventive 
approach to the climate-related security challenge” (Council of the European 
Union, 2008b: 22). 
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Finally, the resolution On Building a Global Climate Change Alliance between 
the European Union and poor developing countries most vulnerable to 
climate change, approved by the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
European Parliament in September 2008, reiterates the conclusions of the 
joint report on Climate Change and International Security (March, 2008). In 
the Committee’s view, “climate change is becoming the biggest security 
threat in today's world” (European Parliament, 2008: 3). The Committee 
argues “climate change should be central to Europe's preventive security 
policy” (European Parliament, 2008: 3). 
 
The discourse in these documents clearly presents climate change as an 
existential threat to European standards of living and stability. Although the 
focus of the documents is not on the risks climate change poses directly to 
Europe, they are still convincing in terms of the threat climate change 
represents to the European. Distant conflicts over resources and territory, 
tensions over energy supplies and climate-induced migratory movements are 
very likely to have consequences that will reach Europe and endanger its 
security. This discourse demonstrates how the European institutions are 
performing a securitizing move regarding climate change. 
 
Member States Governments 
Some individual member states have also had an important role in elevating 
the profile of climate change in Europe. Notably the United Kingdom, 
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Germany and France have pushed climate change to the realm of security, at 
the national, European and international levels. This dissertation will focus on 
these three member states because of their distinguished role as climate 
securitizers and also for the reason that they included climate change in their 
respective national security strategies. 
 
British Government 
The United Kingdom (UK) presents itself as being in the frontline of the 
battle against climate change, pursuing an “ambitious [climate] agenda” (UK 
Prime Minister’s Office, 2007). Remarkably, the UK government played a 
crucial role in taking climate change to the United Nations Security Council. 
During its Presidency of the Security Council, and despite the reluctance of 
the United States, Russia and China, the UK called the Council’s first-ever 
meeting on the impact of climate change on April 2007.  
 
The former-British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, who chaired the 
Security Council session, argued that climate change was a security issue 
although not one of narrow national security (United Nations Department of 
Public Information, 2007). She asserted climate change was about “our 
collective security in a fragile and increasingly interdependent world” (United 
Nations Department of Public Information, 2007). The former-Foreign 
Secretary stated 
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[t]he Security Council is the forum to discuss issues that threaten 
the peace and security of the international community. What 
makes wars start? Fights over water. Changing patterns of rainfall. 
Fights over food production, land use... There are few greater 
potential threats to our economies too... but also to peace and 
security itself. (BBC News, 2007) 
 
Previously, on June 2006, Beckett had demonstrated her commitment to 
climate change issues when she appointed a Special Representative on 
Climate Change. John Ashton, the first UK’s Foreign Secretary's Special 
Representative on Climate Change, has been an active voice in framing 
climate change as a security issue. In an opinion article to BBC News he 
states “we need to treat climate change not as a long-term threat to our 
environment but as an immediate threat to our security and prosperity” 
(Ashton, 2007). And then he adds,  
 
[violent c]onflict always has multiple causes, but a changing 
climate amplifies all the other factors. Katrina and Darfur illustrate 
how an unstable climate will make it harder to deliver security 
unless we act more effectively now to neutralise the threat. 
(Ashton, 2007) 
 
According to Ashton, the security risks posed by climate change can be 
prevented, if this issue is given the same type of attention and amount of 
resources that traditional security issues receive. He argues that 
 
[t]he technologies to avoid an even more unstable climate are 
already available. Deploying them rapidly is well within what we 
can afford. What is needed is an investment internationally of 
political imagination backed up by public resources on the scale 
that publics routinely expect for the more traditional aspects of 
national security. (BBC News, 2007) 
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On March 2008, the UK published its first National Security Strategy, under 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s leadership. The National Security Strategy of 
the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world identifies climate 
change as a “driver of insecurity”, i.e., a factor “which can drive insecurity, 
instability, or conflict” (Cabinet Office, 2008: 16). The document clearly 
states 
 
Climate change is potentially the greatest challenge to global 
stability and security, and therefore to national security. Tackling 
its causes, mitigating its risks and preparing for and dealing with 
its consequences are critical to our future security (…). (Cabinet 
Office, 2008: 18) 
 
Besides being acknowledged as a “driver of insecurity” in itself, climate 
change is also viewed as an important element in exacerbating other “global 
challenges”, such as competition for energy resources, demographic 
pressures, and food and water insecurity. It is worth noting that in the first 
UK National Security Strategy, one can find the term ‘climate change’ 
mentioned 43 times. At the same time, ‘terrorism’ (‘counter-terrorism’ 
included) is mentioned 52 times, `weapons of mass destruction’ (‘wmd’ 
included) appears 10 times and the word ‘nuclear’ is mentioned 25 times. 
These numbers are significant as they indicate the relevance climate change 
is gaining in comparison to more traditional security threats, as is the case of 
nuclear, or more recent but widely recognised threats, such as terrorism. 
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Although the document includes climate change in the category of “factors 
which are not in themselves direct security threats to the United Kingdom” 
(Cabinet Office, 2008: 16), a vocabulary of security is clearly used to address 
climate change, including the need for urgent action and defensive 
measures. It reads: 
 
Climate change is likely to have serious consequences for 
international stability and security, and an integrated and 
international response is urgently needed to tackle cause and 
effect. That includes defensive measures (…). (Cabinet Office, 
2008: 5) 
 
The use of this vocabulary of security constitutes clearly a security speech 
act. The British government has thus acted as a securitizing actor at the 
domestic level, directing the securitizing move at its own citizens, but also at 
the international level, directing the securitizing move at other governmental 
leaders. At both levels, the British government has presented climate change 
as an existential threat to the standards of living and stability of the UK, the 
EU and the world as a whole. 
 
German Government 
Along with the United Kingdom, and among EU-members, Germany is one of 
the most active voices on climate protection. The programme of the German 
Presidency of the European Union – January 1 to June 30, 2007 – had a 
significant focus on environmental and climate protection (German 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2007).  
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In a Government Policy Statement that followed the March 2007 European 
Council, the German Federal Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel stated that 
“[a]bove all, investment in climate protection means security from the 
destruction associated with unfettered climate change” (Federal Ministry for 
the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2007). The 
German Environmental Minister believes “[g]lobal security in the 21st century 
will be determined to a large extent by energy supply security and the 
conservation of the natural resources that are vital for life” (Federal Ministry 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, 2007). 
 
Chancellor Angela Markel, speaking at the UN Secretary-General's High-Level 
Event on Climate Change in September 2007, said that “the impact [of 
climate change] will be dramatic, unless we take resolute action” (The 
Federal Chancelor, 2007). Merkel went on to ask “[d]o we want to live in a 
world where our coastal cities may be inundated while in other regions 
people are desperate for water? Or do we want to live in a world that offers 
us a secure and bright future?” (The Federal Chancelor, 2007). 
 
A month before, the German Chancellor hosted the G8 Summit in 
Heiligendamm, under its Presidency, which included climate protection issues 
in the agenda. The Summit’s Chair summary states 
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[c]ombating climate change is one of the major challenges for 
mankind and it has the potential to seriously damage our natural 
environment and the global economy (…). We are convinced that 
urgent and concerted action is needed and accept our 
responsibility to show leadership in tackling climate change. (The 
Federal Chancellor, 2007b) 
 
The 2006 German White Paper on Security Policy, Germany’s most recent 
National Security Strategy, refers to environmental risks as issues that can 
intensify other risks, reason for which the Federal Office of Defence 
Administration also addresses environmental protection (Federal Ministry of 
Defence, 2006: 107). Although it does not focus on climate change as a 
security threat specifically, it identifies the issue’s potential for exacerbating 
other security problems (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006: 19). 
 
More recently, in May 2008, the German CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group 
approved a security strategy paper entitled A Security Strategy for Germany. 
The document outlines the parliamentary group’s vision for a new German 
national security strategy. In the paper, climate change figures among the 
key challenges and strategic objectives. It reads:  
 
Climate change is not only an environmental or energy issue – it 
also presents a security threat. The first effects of climate change 
are already visible and flooding, heat waves, food crises, 
droughts, forest fires and rising sea levels are all on the increase 
and if we are unable to counteract these developments the 
number of conflicts will multiply. (CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen 
Bundestag, 2008: 6)  
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The Parliamentary Group argues that “Germany’s security policy must be in a 
position to address the impact of climate change and contribute to managing 
the consequences this has for [Germany’s] security” (CDU/CSU Fraktion im 
Deutschen Bundestag, 2008: 6). 
 
The adoption of the CDU/CSU security strategy paper is relevant as a 
securitizing move being performed by the political group in power that aims 
at raising climate change’s profile as a security issue within Germany. To 
sustain this position, the German government has subsidised reports that 
address the security implications of climate change. 
 
In 2008, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 
the German Federal Government’s development aid agency, published 
Climate Change and Security: Challenges for German Development 
Cooperation. The study explores the links between climate change, its effects 
and the resulting potentials for violent conflict and security risks (GTZ, 2008: 
5). It warns that “climate change will lead over the long term to additional 
resource scarcity and environmental degradation, and may thus amplify or 
trigger social and political tensions, conflicts and security problems” (GTZ, 
2008: 12). The study identifies sectoral trends created by climate change 
that pose risks to security, such as decline in water availability and food 
production, energy problems, and additional overstretch of governance 
structures (GTZ, 2008: 7). 
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But the study with most impact in the elevation of climate change to the 
security realm was World in Transition – Climate Change as a Security Risk 
by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), a scientific 
advisory body set up by the German Federal Government. The 2007 study 
clearly identifies climate change as a threat to security, arguing that “without 
resolute counteraction, climate change will overstretch many societies’ 
adaptive capacities within the coming decades (…) jeopardizing national and 
international security to a new degree” (WBGU, 2007: 1). 
 
According to the WBGU study climate change “amplifies mechanisms which 
lead to insecurity and violence” thus creating “climate-induced conflict 
constellations” (WBGU, 2007: 2). The study identifies regional hotspots for 
security risks associated with climate change, namely Central Asia, India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, China, the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico and 
the Andean region and Amazonia (WBGU, 2007: 3). The study further 
identifies a number of threats to international stability and security posed by 
climate change. These include a growth in the number of weak and fragile 
states, an increase in international distributional conflicts and the 
overstretching of classic security policy. Climate change is also predicted to 
trigger and intensify migration, increasing the potential for violent conflict 
(WBGU, 2007: 5-6).  
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The WBGU study became a reference in the approach to climate change 
security consequences. Its findings have been widely cited at the political 
and academic levels, serving also as a basis for other studies on the subject. 
The content of the WGBU study is a speech act which clearly presents 
climate change as a security threat, thus contributing strongly to the German 
government securitizing move. 
 
French Government 
The third European government that has shown a high commitment to 
climate change issues is France. One of the main objectives of the French 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union – from July 1 to December 
31, 2008 – was working towards a leadership role for Europe in the fight 
against climate change. In its Work Programme, climate change was 
identified as one of the main challenges confronting the EU (French 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2008).  
 
In June 2008, the French Government published The French White Paper on 
Defence and National Security. Although climate change is not so prominent 
in the French strategy as it is in the British and German strategies, the 
document does not neglect the issue. Climate change is portrayed as a new 
risk that needs to be addressed on a global scale and whose security impacts 
need to be calculated rapidly (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 25). According 
to the document, global warming, along with other damage to the biosphere, 
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constitutes a type of disorder caused by rising energy consumption and a 
growing demand for natural resources (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 25). 
 
The White Paper argues that violent climate accidents can cause widespread 
social disruptions, representing a new scale of risks to which the French 
community is subjected (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 53). Hence, besides 
focusing on defence against external aggression, the strategy also focuses 
on the need to protect both population and national territory “unintentional 
risks such as (…) natural disasters made more intense by environmental and 
climate changes” (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 66). Moreover, the strategy 
recognises climate change’s potential contribution to violent conflict. 
 
Foreseeable tensions over strategic resources such as energy, 
water, and strategic commodities – notably food and energy – can 
also directly fuel major crises across one or more of the world’s 
regions. The same is true of the long-term effects of climate 
warming if they are not prevented soon enough. (Ministère de la 
Défense, 2008: 55) 
When addressing the role of collective and regional security organisations, 
the White Paper argues these institutions should deal with climate change. 
 
Collective security also implies concerted action and regulation in 
the fields of international public health, conflict prevention, 
development assistance and the fight against poverty, preserving 
the environment and combating the consequences of climate 
change (…). (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 113) 
 
The document also envisages an evolution in civil defence and protection 
capabilities in order to take greater account of the projected change in the 
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scale of risks, including those posed by climate change (Ministère de la 
Défense, 2008: 220). 
 
By including climate change in its security strategy, the French government is 
arguing that climate change should be dealt at the security level. Thus, the 
French government is also calling for a securitization of the issue, acting as a 
securitizing actor.  
 
Pressure Groups and Lobbyists 
Non-governmental actors have also been increasingly calling for the 
securitization of climate change. A significant number of studies and reports 
by these actors have contributed to elevate climate change to the security 
realm. This dissertation addresses reports from four independent European 
institutions, two of them connected to security, the Oxford Research Group 
and the Royal United Services Institute, and the other two having a more 
humanitarian and development character, International Alert and Oxfam 
International. 
 
Independent research institutions connected to security and defence are 
increasingly calling for the inclusion of climate change in the security 
agenda3. In June 2006, the Oxford Research Group, a British think tank, 
                                                          
3 For examples outside Europe see CNA Corporation (2007) and CSIS (2007) 
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published a report that clearly identifies climate change as one of “the root 
causes of conflict and insecurity in today’s world and the likely determinants 
of future conflict” (Abbott, et al., 2006: 4). In Global Responses to Global 
Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century, Chris Abbott, Paul Rogers 
and John Sloboda argue that the long-term security implications of climate 
change “are far more serious, lasting and destructive than those of 
international terrorism” (Abbott, et al., 2006: 7), and add that “climate 
change will undoubtedly overshadow every other issue of international 
security in the coming decades” (Abbott, et al., 2006: 27). 
 
A subsequent paper by the Oxford Research Group published in January 
2008, An Uncertain Future: Law Enforcement, National Security and Climate 
Change, explores the links between climate change, socio-economic impacts 
and security consequences. In the paper, the author Chris Abbott, argues 
that 
 
Climate change can no longer be considered solely as an 
environmental issue. The well-documented physical effects of 
climate change (…) will have knock-on socio-economic impacts 
(…). These in turn could produce serious security consequences 
(civil unrest, intercommunal violence, and international instability) 
that will present new challenges to governments trying to 
maintain domestic stability (Abbott, 2008: 3). 
 
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), also an independent British think 
tank, published Delivering Climate Security: International Security Responses 
to a Climate Changed World in December 2007. According to Nick Mabey, 
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author of the report, “climate change is already creating hard security 
threats, but it has no hard security solutions” (Mabey, 2007: 1). The author 
argues that 
 
[i]n the next decades, climate change will drive as significant a 
change in the strategic security environment as the end of the 
Cold War. If uncontrolled, climate change will have security 
implications of similar magnitude to the World Wars, but which 
will last for centuries. The past will provide no guide to this 
coming future. (Mabey, 2007: 2) 
 
The focus of the report is on security sector actors’ responsibility on dealing 
with the threat of climate change, whose impact, the author believes, can be 
minimised through security measures (Mabey, 2007: 2). 
 
Humanitarian non-governmental organisations have also increasingly used a 
language of security to address climate change. Although the focus is on 
human security, and thus somewhat different from that of the security 
research institutions, these organisations still have an important role as 
securitizing actors. 
 
In November 2007, International Alert, an independent peacebuilding 
organisation based in London, published A Climate of Conflict: The Links 
Between Climate Change, Peace and War. The report, by Dan Smith and 
Janani Vivekananda, addresses the social and human consequences of 
climate change, particularly the risks of conflict and instability. The report 
warns that “there is a real risk that climate change will compound the 
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propensity for violent conflict, which in turn will leave communities poorer, 
less resilient and less able to cope with the consequences of climate change” 
(Smith and Vivekananda, 2007: 3). In the report the authors identify 46 
states with high-risk of climate induced armed conflict and a further group of 
56 states with risk of violent climate induced conflict over the longer term 
(Smith and Vivekananda, 2007: 17). 
 
In April 2009, Oxfam International published The Right to Survive: The 
Humanitarian Challenge for the Twenty-First Century, a report that addresses 
environmental changes’ impact on international humanitarian assistance. The 
Report supports that expected increase in climate-related disasters, 
traditional humanitarian response will be ineffective (Oxfam International, 
2009: 28-29). The report also assesses climate change’s potential for conflict 
and suggests that  
 
The impact of climate change will not just be confined to natural 
disasters and gradual shifts in weather patterns or sea levels. 
Globally, traditional drivers of violent conflict will be made all the 
more potent by the impact of climate change. (Oxfam 
International, 2009: 29) 
 
The report argues that climate change is already having a large impact 
“undermining millions of people’s fundamental human rights: rights to life, 
security, food, water, health and shelter” (Oxfam International, 2009: 49). 
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Despite focusing on distinct aspects, these non-governmental actors are 
securitizing actors because they are declaring a referent object, be it the 
state, international stability or human security, to be existentially threatened 
by climate change. The securitizing move being carried out by these non-
governmental actors is simultaneously influencing and being influenced by 
the political actors’ securitizing move. In fact, regarding climate change’s 
security implications, there is mutual influence between both types of actors. 
The speech acts of governmental actors are used by non-governmental 
actors as evidence of the existence of a security problem, and vice-versa. 
This thus reinforces the securitizing move. 
 
Functional Actors 
Functional actors are defined by the Copenhagen authors as actors who 
affect the dynamics of a specific sector and significantly influence decisions 
in the field of security, without attempting to securitize any issue. Buzan et 
al. (1998: 79) consider that in respect to the environmental sector, 
governments and their agencies are functional actors, for they set 
environmental rules and determine how these are enforced. In light of this, it 
is possible to say that if the member states have an indisputable role as 
securitizing actors, they also have a role as functional actors. 
 
The Copenhagen authors do not address the possibility of the same actor 
assuming the roles of both securitizing and functional actors in the same 
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process of securitization. However, the process of climate change 
securitization in the EU suggests that this can occur. The observation of the 
here considered member states governments’ conduct on climate change 
suggests that these have a dual behaviour regarding the issue. On the one 
hand they push for climate change securitization, but on the other hand their 
actions on climate change seem disconnected from security concerns. 
 
As it has been demonstrated, in specific occasions the UK, Germany and 
France have assumed the role of securitizing actors, calling for security on 
behalf of climate. When, for example, they include climate change in their 
security strategies, the goal is clearly to securitize the issue, and they thus 
act as securitizing actors. The same is true when, for instance, the UK called 
for a Security Council meeting on Climate Change. The aim was to elevate 
climate change to the security realm. 
 
However, member states have also operated as functional actors at given 
times. They clearly play a functional actor’s role when they adopt policies or 
legislation that aims to mitigate climate change. Also when in their 
presidencies of the EU they commit to push for more ambitious climate 
policies they are acting as functional actors. It could be argued that security 
concerns are behind these efforts. However they constitute neither attempts 
to securitize climate change, nor explicit efforts to address its security 
consequences. 
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Indeed, climate change has been a declared priority in the EU presidencies of 
the UK, Germany and France. The British Presidency in 2005 had among its 
goals ensuring an active role for Europe at the United Nations Climate 
Change negotiations to achieve a post-2012 strategy, pursuing an 
international engagement with the growing economies of China and India 
and also addressing the impact of aviation on climate change (UK Prime 
Minister’s Office, 2005). 
 
The 2007 German Presidency of the EU had a significant focus on climate 
protection as well. The European Council held in March 2007 under the 
German aegis included a noticeable attempt to integrate energy policy and 
climate protection (German Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 
2007). Also during the French Presidency climate change was identified as 
one of the main challenges confronting the EU (French Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union, 2008). The set of proposals put forward by 
the French presidency materialised in the adoption of the climate action and 
renewable energy package. 
 
These examples show the member states commitment to address climate 
change, but with these actions they are clearly not operating as securitizing 
actors. Even if this behaviour affects climate policies, these actions do not 
intend to securitize climate change. Hence, the addressed member states 
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present a dual behaviour in the process of securitization of climate change. If 
at given times they push for climate change securitization, in other moments 
their actions on climate change fall in the role of functional actors. 
 
Audience  
It has been demonstrated that in relation to climate change, the discourse 
from the EU institutions and individual Member states as well as other non-
governmental actors (securitizing actors) has transformed climate change 
into the form of existential threat to the standards of living of the European 
people and the stability of the EU. The securitization of an issue is not, 
however, concluded, unless it is accepted by the relevant audience. For an 
issue to be securitized, it is essential that an audience accepts it as such, i.e., 
that an audience accepts the need/possibility of adopting exceptional 
measures to deal with the existential threat. This corresponds to the second 
stage of the process of securitization.  
 
According to Buzan, et al. (1998: 25), for an issue to become securitized it is 
not necessary that emergency measures have been adopted, only that the 
existential threat has been argued and gained enough resonance, making it 
possible to legitimise emergency measures, if needs be (Buzan et al., 1998: 
25). Consequently, it becomes necessary to evaluate to what extent the 
European public opinion accepts moving climate change into the security 
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realm. For this, media and public opinion will be analysed as actors able of 
transmitting the audience’s level of acceptance of the securitizing move. 
 
Media 
One of the most efficient vehicles of spreading leaders’ discourses is the 
mass media. The media play a crucial role both in forming and in reflecting 
public opinion. In relation to climate change and security, European media 
have increasingly published news on climate change, reflecting the 
governmental speech on climate change, i.e., the securitizing move.  
 
British Written Media 
In the UK, the written media has been progressively exhibiting alarming 
climate change related headlines: “Climate change 'our greatest threat'” 
(Guardian.co.uk, 2004); “Climate change and pollution are killing millions, 
says study” (The Guardian, 2005); “Climate change a bigger security threat 
than terrorism, says report” (The Guardian, 2006a); “Climate change could 
lead to global conflict, says Beckett” (The Guardian, 2007a); “Climate change 
‘will lead to warfare over food and water’” (The Times, 2008); “Climate 
change may spark conflict with Russia, EU told” (The Guardian, 2008a); 
“Climate ‘threatens’ European security” (Financial Times, 2008). 
 
A significant number of articles actually compared the threat of climate 
change to that of global terrorism. In September 2004, The Guardian online 
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said that the “delegates [of the British Liberal Democrat Party] voted 
overwhelmingly to back the party's position that climate change was now a 
bigger threat to mankind than global terrorism” (Guardian.co.uk, 2004). In 
June 2006, The Guardian covered a report which claimed that “the effects of 
climate change – displacement of peoples, food shortages, social unrest – 
have long-term security implications far greater than those of terrorism” (The 
Guardian, 2006a). And in April 2007, the Financial Times reported the CNA 
Corporation study, a United States of America military report, which “lays out 
strong support for a link between climate change and terrorism” (Financial 
Times, 2007a). 
 
Other articles made a comparison between climate change and weapons of 
mass destruction. In September 2004, The Guardian, citing Norman Baker, 
the environment spokesman of the British Liberal Democrat Party, wrote that 
“climate change is a weapon of mass destruction and far more real than the 
ones [the government has] been vainly combing Iraq for” (Guardian.co.uk, 
2004). On the Security Council meeting on climate change in April 2007, The 
Guardian wrote “Council debates 'weather of mass destruction'” (The 
Guardian, 2007b). 
 
A substantial number of news predicted climate change to be a widespread 
cause for violent conflict. In June 2006, The Guardian citing the Oxford 
Research Group stated that “the most likely causes of future conflict are 
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climate change, competition for natural resources, social and economic 
marginalisation and militarisation” (The Guardian, 2006a). Reporting a study 
by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the Financial Times Online 
wrote  
 
Governments must invest more in preventing climate change-
related conflict or else face myriad crises around the world as 
global warming triggers disputes and exacerbates existing 
insecurity (...). Water scarcity, falling crop yields, rising sea levels, 
more frequent extreme weather events and mass migration are 
just some of the potential sources of tension if governments do 
not develop and implement a credible strategy to combat climate 
change. (Financial Times, 2007b) 
 
Citing the British Foreign-Secretary Margaret Beckett, The Guardian wrote 
that “climate change could spawn a new era of conflicts around the world 
over water and other scarce resources” (The Guardian, 2007a). Reporting a 
subsequent study by the Oxford Research Group, in January 2008, The 
Times wrote that “climate change will have a long-term impact on the 
nation’s security as wars break out over food and water supplies around the 
world” (The Times, 2008). 
 
Some news already suggested that existing conflicts were climate-related. 
Citing a study by UNEP, The Guardian wrote on June 2007 that “the conflict 
in Darfur has been driven by climate change and environmental degradation, 
which threaten to trigger a succession of new wars across Africa” (The 
Guardian, 2007c). In May 2007, The Guardian quoted British Foreign 
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Secretary Margaret Beckett who claimed “climate-driven conflicts were 
already under way in Africa” (The Guardian 2007a). 
 
There were also news that warned of the likelihood of climate change 
originating mass migration and climate refugees, posing a subsequent threat 
to national security. On January 2008, The Times wrote: “Hundreds of 
millions of environmental refugees will seek new places to live, with many of 
them heading for Britain (...) security services [will] be challenged 
increasingly by the number of refugees” (The Times, 2008). On March of the 
same year, The Guardian wrote 
 
Europe needs to brace itself for a new wave of migration with a 
very different cause – global warming. The ravages already being 
inflicted on parts of the developing world by climate change are 
engendering a new type of refugee, the "environmental migrant”. 
(The Guardian, 2008b) 
 
Climate change was thus presented as an existential threat in the British 
media, functioning as a vehicle of the securitizing move being performed by 
both governmental and non-governmental securitizing actors. By comparing 
the dimension of the security threat posed by climate change to that posed 
by weapons of mass destruction or global terrorism, the latter still so present 
in the public imaginary, the British media is diffusing the message that 
climate is an urgent threat. The same is true for evidencing the likelihood of 
climate creating a migratory flux with Europe, and the UK in particular, as 
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destiny, since migration is already perceived as a potential security problem 
itself.  
 
German Written Media 
The German media also gave substantial coverage to the developments 
which, at the EU and international levels, aimed at framing climate change as 
a security issue. In the German media one can also find news that compare 
climate change to terrorism regarding the magnitude of the threat. In 
February 2004, citing United States experts, the Süddeutsche Zeitung wrote 
that “the dangers of climate change for world-wide stability ‘would exceed by 
far those of terrorism’”4 (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2004). 
 
Attention was also given to the likelihood of climate change causing violent 
conflict and thus endangering world peace. Reporting on the Security Council 
meeting in April 2007, Die Zeit announced: “Climate change: Threat for the 
world peace”5 (Die Zeit, 2007a). In May 2007, also Die Zeit published an 
article on “The Climate Wars”6, where it stated that 
 
since all conflicts are always also conflicts over resources, raw 
materials and living space, in the future climate change will cut 
                                                          
4 Author’s free translation: “die Gefahren des Klimawandels für die weltweite Stabilität 
überträfen „bei weitem die des Terrorismus“.   
 
5 Author’s free translation: “Klimawandel Gefahr für den Weltfrieden” 
 
6 Author’s free translation: “Die Klima-Kriege” 
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these commodities in addition. The result: with climate change, 
tensions on the globe will intensify.7 (Die Zeit, 2007b) 
 
Reporting on the publication of the WBGU study, Süddeutsche Zeitung wrote 
that “with climate change the danger of crises, wars and migrations will 
increase (…); there is danger of distributive conflicts over water and food 
which will become even scarcer in some regions due to global warming”8 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2007a). 
 
The German media also focused on the issue of climate-related migratory 
movements. Citing UN officials, in April 2007 the Süddeutsche Zeitung wrote 
that “according to estimations the consequences of the climate change will 
already bring about 50 million environmental refugees in the year 2010”9 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2007b). In September 2007, the Spiegel asked “What 
Will Become of Tuvalu's Climate Refugees?” and noted that it is 
“unprecedented (…) for a country to completely lose its territory without the 
use of military force (…) Tuvalu is now regarded as a prime example of just 
how much damage climate change can do to a country” (Spiegel Online: 
2007). 
                                                          
7 Author’s free translation: “Denn alle Konflikte sind immer auch Konflikte um Ressourcen, 
Rohstoffe und Lebensraum; in Zukunft wird der Klimawandel diese Güter zusätzlich 
verknappen. Die Folge: Mit dem Klimawandel verschärfen sich die Spannungen auf dem 
Globus.” 
 
8 Author’s free translation: Mit dem Klimawandel wird die Gefahr von Krisen, Kriegen und 
Flucht (…) Zu befürchten seien Verteilungskonflikte um Wasser und Nahrung, die in einigen 
Regionen wegen der Erderwärmung noch knapper würden”   
 
9 Author’s free translation: “berichtet von Schätzungen, nach denen die Folgen des 
Klimawandels schon im Jahr 2010 etwa 50 Millionen Umweltflüchtlinge hervorbringen 
warden” 
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Although the German media is less sensationalist in relation to climate 
change’s impacts on international security than the British media, this issue 
still had a large coverage in its main newspapers. These news indicate that 
the perspective of climate change intensifying resource wars and 
endangering world peace has reached German citizens. Also, there is a 
visible concern with climate-related migratory movements. This suggests that 
the securitizing move has reached the relevant audience, i.e. German public 
opinion. 
 
French Written Media 
The French media was also attentive to the implications of climate change at 
the security level. In April 2008, Le Figaro quoting Nick Mabey, author of the 
report of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), wrote that “global 
warming will lead to a change in the domain of strategic security as 
important as the end of the Cold War"10 (Le Figaro, 2008a). 
 
One of the central issues in French reporting of climate change was its 
potential for intensifying conflict over resources. In April 2007, Le Monde 
quoted the British Foreign Secretary who argued in the Security Council 
meeting on climate change that “an unstable climate will exacerbate some of 
                                                          
10 Author’s free translation: “le réchauffement climatique va entraîner une modification dans 
le domaine de la sécurité stratégique aussi importante qu'à la fin de la guerre froide" 
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the central causes of conflict, such as migratory pressures and competition 
for natural resources”11 (Le Monde, 2007a).  
 
A significant number of articles even suggested the possibility of climate 
change triggering violent conflict at a global scale. Referring to the WBGU 
Report, Le Monde wrote in December 2007 that “global warming could cause 
a ‘global civil war’ by exacerbating latent tensions between populations”12 (Le 
Monde, 2007b). Also referring to the WBGU study, Le Figaro asked “Towards 
a Climate World War?”13 (Le Figaro, 2007). In April 2008, quoting Nick 
Mabey, Le Monde wrote that "if left unchecked, global warming will have 
implications for the security of a similar magnitude to the two world wars but 
lasting for centuries"14 (Le Monde, 2008). 
 
A substantial amount of attention was also devoted to the issue of climate 
refugees in the French media. In March 2008, L’Express wrote that “in ten 
years, climate refugees will count in the millions, most victims of global 
                                                          
11 Author’s free translation: “un climat instable exacerbera certaines des causes centrales 
des conflits, comme les pressions migratoires et la compétition pour les ressources 
naturelles"  
 
12 Author’s free translation: “Le réchauffement climatique pourrait provoquer une ‘guerre 
civile mondiale’ en exacerbant des tensions latentes entre des populations” 
 
13 Author’s free translation: “Vers une guerre mondiale du climat?” 
14 Author’s free translation: “S'il n'est pas maîtrisé, le réchauffement climatique aura des 
implications dans le domaine de la sécurité d'une ampleur similaire aux deux conflits 
mondiaux, mais qui dureront pendant des siècles" 
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warming”15 (L’Express.fr, 2008). Referring to the impacts of climate-related 
migrations in Europe, Le Figaro wrote in January 2008 that “the massive 
influx of refugees can reduce the capacity of developed countries to govern. 
According to experts, a refugee in two will be a climate refugee in thirty 
years”16 (Le Figaro, 2008b). 
 
In the French media there is also a focus on climate related conflicts, 
including the possibility of such conflicts occurring on a global scale. Another 
focal point refers to climate induced migrations. Since there is already an 
immigration-security nexus in Europe, climate related migratory pressures 
appeals to the securitization of climate change. The diffusion of such 
information suggests that the speech act that depicts climate change as an 
existential threat is reaching the audience. 
 
It should be added that the diffusion of this information by the selected 
media does not confine itself to the British, German and French citizens. 
Many of these newspapers are read throughout Europe, thus reaching a 
wider European audience. 
 
                                                          
15 Author’s free translation: “D’ici une dizaine d’années, "les réfugiés climatiques se 
compteront par millions, la plupart victimes du réchauffement de la planète" 
 
16 Author’s free translation: “l'arrivée massive de réfugiés peut entraîner une baisse des 
capacités des pays développés à gouverner. Selon les experts, un réfugié sur deux sera un 
réfugié climatique dans trente ans" 
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Opinion Poll 
On the specific issue of climate change as a security threat, no study has yet 
been conducted to survey European public opinion. However, there are some 
studies which are useful to understand the evolution of European perceptions 
on the relation between climate change and security. 
 
Special Eurobarometer 300, requested by the European Commission and the 
European Parliament, surveyed Europeans' attitudes towards climate change.  
The study was carried out from March to May 2008, with interviews made to 
30.170 citizens in the 27 Member States of the EU, in the three candidate 
countries for accession (Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia) and in the Turkish Cypriot Community (European Commission, 
2008b: 2).  
 
When asked what they considered to be the most serious problem currently 
facing the world as a whole, 62% of Europeans identified “climate 
change/global warming” as it. Climate change ranked second after “poverty, 
the lack of food and drinking water”, which 68% of Europeans considered 
being a major problem. “International terrorism” ranked below climate 
change, with 53% of the respondents recognising it as one of the world’s 
most serious problems (European Commission, 2008b: 7). When only 
respondents’ first answers are considered, “global warming/climate change” 
becomes the first on the list of serious problems in the world, with 30%. 
65 
 
“Poverty, the lack of food and drinking water” falls to the second position 
with 29% and “international terrorism” comes in third with 17% (European 
Commission, 2008b: 11). 
 
The survey shows that “[a]t the country level, absolute majorities in nearly 
all countries regard "global warming/climate change" as a serious problem” 
(European Commission, 2008b: 9). In France, for example, a poll conducted 
by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (Ifop) for Le Monde in July 2008, 
concluded that the French believe global warming is far riskier than nuclear 
power. When asked about the risks they see as the greatest concern, 53% of 
respondents cited those related to climate change, against the 27% who 
referred to nuclear risks. In a similar poll conducted in April 2002, only 20% 
of respondents had identified climate change as a risk, while 33% were 
concerned with the risks of nuclear power (Ifop, 2008: 4). 
 
These findings demonstrate that the European public is increasingly aware of 
the seriousness of climate change, identifying it as a severe problem facing 
Europe and the World. Nevertheless, the fact that climate change is 
acknowledged as a risk does not by itself allows us to conclude that the 
Europeans public accepts the climate change securitizing move. Therefore, it 
is necessary to connect these findings to other indicators in order to 
understand the level of acceptance of the move. 
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The Special Eurobarometer 300, previously mentioned, concluded that 65% 
of Europeans did not agree that the seriousness of climate change had been 
exaggerated as opposed to 26% that believed it had (European Commission, 
2008b: 24). This is very significant if one takes into account that climate 
change has been increasingly presented to European citizens as a security 
threat. Acknowledging that climate change’s seriousness has not been 
exaggerated suggests that Europeans accept the securitizing move. 
 
Another interesting indicator is the willingness of Europeans to pay higher 
costs for green energy as a means to contribute to climate change’s 
reduction. The Eurobarometer poll indicates that 44% of Europeans affirm 
they would be ready to pay between 1% and 30% more for green energy, 
against 30% who would not (European Commission, 2008b: 68). These 
values, combined with the 65% of Europeans who believed climate change’s 
seriousness had not been blown out of proportion, suggest Europeans may 
be ready to accept extraordinary measures to tackle climate change. 
 
Furthermore, the Eurobarometer number 70, published on December 2008, 
shows that 23% of Europeans would like most of EU’s budget to be spent on 
climate change and environmental protection, whereas only 17% would like 
it to be spent in defence and security (European Commission, 2008c: 68). 
These values reflect an inverse evolution concerning European perceptions 
towards security and environment, since in the Eurobarometer 68, published 
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on December 2007, 33% of Europeans believed European institutions should 
focus in environmental issues, whereas the biggest percentage of the 
respondents, 36%, considered the focus should be on security (European 
Commission, 2007a: 38). Again, this in and of itself does not prove a general 
acceptance of the securitizing move of climate change, but it clearly suggests 
a change in European perceptions concerning the importance and resources 
that should be allocated to deal with this issue. 
 
Moreover, when compared with security issues importance and the share of 
resources that should be channelled to this sector, environmental issues and 
climate change seem to have become a higher priority for European citizens. 
This shift, associated with the rest of the information on opinion polls, but 
also with the analysis on the audience reaction discussed above, indicates a 
growing willingness of Europeans to accept the adoption of exceptional 
measures towards climate change, namely concerning resource allocation 
and policy prioritisation. 
 
Facilitating Conditions 
All of these actors’ actions and perceptions do not occur in a vacuum and 
Buzan et al. (1998: 32) identify facilitating conditions under which the speech 
act works, in contrast to cases in which the act does not succeed. Such 
conditions fall into two categories, as discussed in Chapter I, that combine 
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for a successful speech act: the internal, linguistic-grammatical, and the 
external, contextual and social. 
 
The authors argue the most important internal condition of the speech act “is 
to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot 
that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 33). The attempt of constructing climate change as a 
security threat has followed these conditions. Climate change has been 
presented by the securitizing actors as an existential threat: “climate change 
is becoming the biggest security threat in today's world” (European 
Parliament, 2008: 3, emphasis added); “we need to treat climate (…) as an 
immediate threat to our security and prosperity” (Ashton, 2007, emphasis 
added). 
 
Also, climate change has been presented as an issue which if not addressed 
may reach a point of no return. In the European Commission’s website’s 
section on climate action one can read that “unless global action is taken 
quickly to stabilise the rising temperature of the earth’s surface, there is 
likely to be irreversible and catastrophic damage” (European Commission, 
2009a). For the EU this is materialised in the goal to limit the increase in the 
average global temperature by 2ºC. According to the Commission, 
 
[t]he EU's objective is to limit global average temperature increase 
to less than 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. This will limit 
the impacts of climate change and the likelihood of massive and 
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irreversible disruptions of the global ecosystem. (European 
Commission, 2007c: 3) 
 
Furthermore, climate change is presented as a threat to which a possible 
way out exists. In other words, although there is still no scientific consensus 
on whether climate change is anthropogenic, the securitizing actors have 
presented it as being so and, consequently, stoppable through human action. 
According to the European Commission, “[g]lobal warming is happening 
because of large amounts of energy that humans produce and use” 
(European Commission, 2009a). As a result, mitigation action is presented as 
the tool to decelerate global warming. The claim that there is a possible way 
out from climate change has been accepted by the audience, as 60% of 
Europeans agree that climate change is a problem which can be solved, 
whereas only 31% believe that the process of climate change is unstoppable 
(European Commission, 2008b: 24). 
 
Regarding the external aspect of the speech act, the authors identify two 
main conditions. The first is the social capital of the enunciator. According to 
this condition, securitization is successful when the securitizing actor is in a 
position of authority. Hence, the relationship between speaker and audience 
determines the likelihood of the audience to accept the claims made in a 
securitizing attempt (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). Regarding this condition, both 
groups of securitizing actors can be said to be in a position of authority. The 
non-governmental securitizing actors are reputable research institutions 
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which gives them a position of “intellectual authority”. As to the bureaucratic 
and governmental securitizing actors, these are in a position of formal 
leadership, whether it is the European institutions or the national 
governments. 
 
The second external condition identified by Buzan et al. (1998: 33) refers to 
the features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede 
securitization. With respect to climate change, securitization has been 
facilitated by the recurrence of extreme weather events and the diffusion of 
a scientific discourse that links those events to climate change (IPCC, 2008). 
A paradigmatic case was Hurricane Katrina on August 2005, one of the 
strongest and most devastating hurricanes to hit the United States of 
America. The devastation caused by Katrina spurred international debate 
over climate change’s potential to cause natural disasters. Besides large-
scale loss of life, such natural disasters can create refugees, lead to social 
tensions and even violence. 
 
In the specific case of Europe, extreme weather events have also raised 
public awareness. The summer of 2003 registered record heat waves across 
Europe causing a high number of related deaths (UNEP, 2004). In 
subsequent summers many European countries have registered high 
temperatures with major impacts on public health (Directorate – General for 
Health and Consumers, 2007). The contribution of unusually high 
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temperatures to the proliferation of severe summer fires across Europe has 
led Greek authorities to argue that these are a consequence of climate 
change (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009). 
 
In recent years, many European countries have also experienced severe 
flooding, notably in the summer of 2002, with the catastrophic floods along 
the Danube and Elbe rivers (BBC News, 2002), and again in 2005 (BBC 
News, 2005). These life-threatening events have also been linked to climate 
change, supporting the notion that climate change is a “real” threat to 
people’s security.  
 
In addition, the academic discourse that links climate change to violent 
conflict has also contributed to the securitization of climate change. In 1994, 
in an article for the journal International Security, Thomas Homer-Dixon 
identified climate change as a plausible cause of violent inter-group conflict 
(1994:6). Although his focus was on resource depletion, Homer-Dixon 
acknowledged global warming would interact with the existing scarcities, 
additionally contributing to violence (Homer-Dixon, 1994: 40). The work 
further developed by Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Team ignited the 
academic debate on the links between climate change and conflict. In August 
2007, the journal Political Geography published a special issue on Climate 
Change and Conflict, edited by Ragnhild Nordås and Nils Petter Gleditsch 
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(2007), where the links between climate change and conflict were explored 
from various perspectives.  
 
The conditions enunciated are thus contributing to the success of climate 
change securitization initiated by two distinct groups of securitizing actors 
identified. As it has been shown, at the bureaucratic and governmental 
levels, the European institutions and the EU member states are performing a 
security speech act regarding climate change. At the non-governmental level, 
pressure groups and lobbyists are also calling for an elevation of climate 
change to the security level. Both these groups aim at securing European 
standards of living and the stability of the EU, referent objects that are seen 
to be threatened by climate change.  
 
Regarding the second step of the process of securitization, it has been 
argued that wide media coverage of climate change security implications, as 
well as opinion indicators, reveals an acceptance by the European public, i.e. 
the relevant audience. Hence, extraordinary measures are legitimized by the 
audience in the realm of the EU. 
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The Consequences of Securitizing Climate Change 
 
The dissertation has so far demonstrated how climate change is a securitized 
issue in the European Union. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, 
extraordinary measures have not yet been adopted to address climate 
change. This chapter presents the strategies defined to tackle climate change 
and their implementation, discussing whether they constitute extraordinary 
measures or normal politics. 
 
The Copenhagen authors support that one of the purposes of the 
securitization approach is to enable an evaluation of whether an issue is 
better handled at the security level (with the adoption of extraordinary 
measures) or within normal politics (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). However, they 
do not define clearly what constitute extraordinary measures, stating only 
that these are “outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 24). 
 
In face of this limited definition, Gramsci’s distinction between grand or 
extraordinary politics and petty or small politics can be very useful. According 
to Gramsci, small politics deals with problems, issues, conflicts and power 
struggles within an already established structure (Gramsci, 1975 apud 
Fontana, 2002: 170). Extraordinary politics however is the politics that 
establishes or creates entirely new structures as it deals with “the founding 
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of new States, the struggle for the destruction, the defence, and the 
preservation of determinate organic socio-economic structures” (Gramsci, 
1975 apud Fontana, 2002: 170). 
 
Halls’ reasoning is also very useful here. Drawing on his three subtypes of 
policy change presented previously, Hall argues that 
 
[f]irst and second order change can be seen as cases of “normal 
policymaking”, namely of a process that adjusts policy without 
challenging the overall terms of a given policy paradigm, much 
like normal science. Third order change, by contrast, is likely to 
reflect a very different process, marked by the radical changes in 
the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a 
“paradigm shift”. If first and second order changes preserve the 
broad continuities usually found in patterns of policy, third order 
change is often a more disjunctive process associated with 
periodic discontinuities in policy (Hall, 1993: 279). 
 
In relation to climate change, the adoption of extraordinary measures would 
imply a significant transformation in climate change policies: the creation of a 
new structure, in Gramsci’s logic, or a paradigm shift, in Hall’s interpretation.  
 
Consequently, the adoption of extraordinary measures on climate change 
would entail the application of a much higher degree of rigor and control in 
environmental policies. This would mean, for example, international emission 
reductions targets surveilled by the United Nations Security Council, with the 
imposition of sanctions for non-compliant states, or the closing of all 
polluting companies by states. 
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Securitizing Actors’ Proposals  
The chapter now analyses the strategies recommended during the 
securitizing move in order to understand the securitizing actor’s intention 
with securitization, i.e. if they argue for the creation of a new structure to 
deal with climate change or if, on the other hand, they prefer that the issue 
is dealt within the realm of normal politics. 
 
European Institutions 
In the Joint Report Climate Change and International Security, the EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
European Commission make recommendations on how the EU should 
address climate change. These are divided in three main categories: 
“enhancing capacities at the EU level” (European Commission, 2008a: 9), 
“EU multilateral leadership to promote global climate security” (European 
Commission, 2008a: 10), and “Cooperation with third countries” (European 
Commission, 2008: 11). 
 
In the first category of measures the focus is on EU's own capacities. Hence, 
an enhancement in research, analysis, monitoring and early warning 
mechanisms is proposed. The EU High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commission argue for the need 
of further building up EU and member states’ planning and capabilities, 
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including civil protection, crisis management and disaster response 
instruments both civilian and military (European Commission, 2008a: 10). 
What is proposed here is the development of existing instruments, rather 
than the adoption of any exceptional measure. Nevertheless, a sense of 
urgency is added in addressing climate change, creating the need for an 
enhancement of EU instruments and capacities. 
 
Regarding the EU multilateral leadership, it is proposed that the EU 
strengthens its leadership towards an ambitious post-2012 agreement, within 
the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, that includes the implementation of 
mitigation and adaptation action plans by all countries. Again this shows 
that, although climate change’s urgency pushes for more ambitious goals, 
these are pursued through the existing framework of negotiations and not 
through exceptional measures.  
 
The report also argues for the need to “consider environmentally-triggered 
additional migratory stress in the further development of a comprehensive 
European migration policy” (European Commission, 2008: 10). Moreover, it 
recommends that attention is given to climate change security risks in the 
multilateral arena, namely within the UN Security Council, the G8 and the 
relevant UN specialised bodies (European Commission, 2008a: 10). Although 
it refers to the Security Council, the report does not claim for extraordinary 
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measures to be taken, only that attention is given to the issue in that 
organism. 
 
As to cooperation with third countries, the report argues for a reinforcement 
of EU’s cooperation and political dialogue instruments, including further 
integration of adaptation and resilience to climate change in EU regional 
strategies and the consolidation of the Global Climate Change Alliance 
(GCCA) between the EU and the most vulnerable developing countries 
(European Commission, 2008: 11). The GCCA is a development cooperation 
mechanism through which the EU intends to work jointly with developing 
countries to integrate climate change into poverty reduction strategies 
(Directorate General for Communication, 2007). For this reason, the creation 
of such alliance is not an extraordinary measure but rather an expected 
development within normal politics, since development strategies already 
include environmental sustainability criteria. 
 
The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 
Providing Security in a Changing World (December 2008), is much vaguer in 
terms of specific strategies to address the security implications of climate 
change. It stresses, nevertheless, the need to improve analysis and early 
warning capabilities. Cooperation is defined as a crucial strategy in tackling 
climate change, both with countries most at risk, the UN and regional 
organisations (European Council, 2008: 6). The document also emphasises 
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the importance of an effective multilateralism, with a new international 
agreement on climate change being defined as a key priority (European 
Council, 2008: 12). 
 
As in the Joint Report Climate Change and International Security, the 
measures proposed by the Report on the Implementation of the European 
Security Strategy fall within the existing structure of climate change policies, 
namely international cooperation and multilateral negotiations. Hence, what 
these securitizing actors are proposing is for the security implications of 
climate change to be addressed at the level of normal politics, rather than 
through exceptional measures. 
 
Member States Governments 
 
British Government 
Chapter four of the UK’s National Security Strategy, dedicated to the United 
Kingdom’s response to its key threats, includes a section on “Tackling 
Climate Change” where the UK government acknowledges the need for an 
integrated international response to tackle both causes and effects of climate 
change. The document argues for a need for defensive measures against 
extreme weather events such as flooding and sea level surges. It also 
identifies modifications on development plans and in the management of 
resources as crucial strategies to mitigate water stress and food insecurity.  
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The document also advocates for changes in energy policies, to achieve 
reductions in global carbon emissions and meeting rising global energy 
demand in a sustainable way. According to the document, the UK is making 
efforts towards a technological and behavioural transition to a low-carbon 
economy.  
 
At the international level, the UK declares to be committed to a leading role 
in multilateral efforts to tackle climate change, which entails binding 
ambitious emission reductions, a global carbon market and clean energy 
frameworks (Cabinet Office, 2008: 50). These measures are not 
extraordinary in any sense. First, it is clear in the document that changes in 
energy policies should not hinder the meeting of energy demands. Second, 
the measures are not new: the current climate policies entail emission 
reductions, the development of a global carbon market and clean energy 
frameworks. 
 
With specific reference to the security implications of climate change, the 
document says that the UK is undertaking a thorough analysis of the likely 
impact of climate change on its territory and also of water and food security 
issues to ensure sustainable and secure supplies. It announces an increase in 
climate change research investment to £100 million to investigate the 
dynamics of long-term climate change, its links to international poverty and 
its impact on conflict (Cabinet Office, 2008: 51). The investment certainly 
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demonstrates the urgency attributed by the UK government to climate 
change. Nevertheless, research is not an extraordinary measure, 
consequently, policy recommendations in the UK remain in the realm of 
normal politics. 
 
German Government 
The CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group security strategy paper makes a number 
of recommendations for German action on climate change. The measures for 
dealing with the security implications of climate change proposed in the 
document are mainly normal policy measures as they fall into the existing 
framework. These include, emission reduction, support for adaptation in 
developing countries, development of effective financial instruments to 
manage the cost of adjustment and coordination at the EU level for 
emergency services to deal with environmental disasters (CDU/CSU Fraktion 
im Deutschen Bundestag, 2008: 6-7). 
 
However, the CDU/CSU paper also proposes the adoption of exceptional 
measures on climate change when they argue for an intervention of the 
Security Council in cases of environmental misconduct. According to the 
CDU/CSU paper, 
 
The United Nations must find a more efficient, and more 
importantly, more pre-emptive approach to the security risks 
presented by climate change. In addition, international law must 
be extended so that the Security Council of the United Nations is 
authorized to act in instances of considerable environmental 
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destruction or major breaches of environmental legislation. 
(CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, 2008: 7) 
 
Such action by the Security Council would fall clearly in the realm of 
extraordinary measures, signifying a shift in current international climate 
policies. 
 
The report by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) makes 
extensive recommendations to German and EU policy-makers, within the 
framework of climate policy as preventive security policy. Within this 
framework, three sets of initiatives are proposed in the study. The first group 
aims at fostering cooperation. Hence it recommends that Germany and the 
EU promote a multilateral order which engages emerging powers, such as 
China and India, and intensify efforts to achieve international cooperation in 
the field of climate protection. 
 
Yet within the first group of initiatives, the study argues for a United Nations 
reform, with a strengthening of its development capacities and an 
appropriate adaptation of the Security Council’s mandate, based on the 
principle “responsibility to protect” (WBGU, 2007: 7). 
 
In WBGU’s view, the impacts of unabated climate change, severe 
environmental degradation and environmentally-induced conflicts 
can be regarded as a threat to international security and world 
peace. Presumably, therefore, the Security Council is authorized to 
take action in cases of widespread destruction of natural 
environmental goods and grave violations of international 
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environmental law, and can apply appropriate sanctions against 
the states responsible. (WBGU, 2007: 7) 
 
Such understanding of the Security Council’s role clearly demonstrates that 
the WBGU is calling for the adoption of extraordinary measures in climate 
policy. 
 
The second group of initiatives aims to prevent conflict by avoiding 
dangerous climate change. Hence, the WBGU recommends that Germany 
and the EU ambitiously pursue international climate policy within the 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol. Also, the study calls for the implementation 
of an energy turnaround in the EU, which includes more ambitious reduction 
targets, increased energy efficiency and the expanded use of renewable 
energies. The development of mitigation strategies through partnerships with 
developing and newly industrialised countries is also proposed (WBGU, 2007: 
8-9). This set of initiatives is in line with what have been the usual 
instruments to deal with climate change. 
 
A third set of proposals aims at preventing conflict by implementing 
adaptation strategies. On this topic, the WBGU recommends that Germany 
and the EU support adaptation strategies in developing countries and 
contribute to the stabilisation of fragile and weak states additionally 
threatened by climate change. What is proposed here is that a climate 
component is added to development aid, which falls within the dynamics of 
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normal politics. Regarding environmental migration, the WGBU proposes its 
management through cooperation and calls for the development of 
international law that protects these migrants (WBGU, 2007: 9-11). Again, 
no extraordinary measures are being called upon, as these would imply 
strong measures at the borders, such as closing them, in order to prevent 
climate refugees from entering into the EU.  
 
In the WGBU study it is reflected the perception that although climate 
change poses risks to security, and should therefore be handled as a security 
issue, the mechanisms to address it should not be classic security 
mechanisms. According to the study, “[c]limate change (...) poses a 
challenge to international security, but classic, military-based security policy 
will be unable to make any major contributions to resolving the impending 
climate crises” (WBGU, 2007:6). 
 
French Government 
The French White Paper on Defence and National Security is quite vague in 
terms of strategies to address climate change. In the paper, the French 
government announces to have requested the creation of a multilateral body 
for prevention and concerted action for combating the effects of global 
warming (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 113). Also, the government 
declares its support for the creation of a regional tsunami warning centre 
that will include tsunami detection, as part of the efforts of preventing the 
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risks posed by climate change (Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 220). 
Although the configuration of these institutions is not defined, it is clear that 
they do not fall under the label of extraordinary measures. 
 
Another reference to action on climate change refers to concerns with 
migratory pressures. The document states that 
 
[s]ecurity in Africa will suffer in the first place from poor living 
conditions due to urban growth, the lack of adequate health 
structures and increasingly scarce local food resources. Climate 
warming is aggravating the situation. France and Europe must 
contribute to the fight against worsening conditions in order to 
curb migratory trends driven by economic and social distress (…). 
(Ministère de la Défense, 2008: 43) 
 
What is being envisaged here is investing in development aid to prevent 
climate-related migration to Europe. This is not of course new. The same 
strategy has been long time used to prevent other types of migration, 
namely economic. Hence, although there is a change in focus, from 
economic migrants to environmental migrants, the measures to address the 
issue remain unaltered. 
 
Pressure groups and lobbyists 
In the 2006 Report Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security 
for the 21st Century, the Oxford Research Group´s main proposal for 
addressing the security impacts of climate change is the stabilisation of 
carbon dioxide levels. According to the Report this should be done by 
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resorting to the development of local renewable energy sources and 
comprehensive energy conservation practices, rather than through the 
development of nuclear energy which would involve security risks (Abbott et 
al., 2006: 11). The report, more than arguing for measures that fall within 
standard energy-climate policies, namely renewables, opposes categorically a 
change in the current energy paradigm: a turn to nuclear energy. 
 
The 2008 Oxford Research Group An Uncertain Future: Law Enforcement, 
National Security and Climate Change advises prevention, mitigation and 
adaptation actions to curb the consequences of climate change. The report 
recommends that climate policies comprise natural disaster protection 
measures and the development of local renewable energy sources and 
resource conservation projects.  It also recommends the development of 
protection and management of environmental refugees and likely migratory 
flows. Lastly, the report suggests that conflict prevention, sustainable 
development and foreign aid programmes take into account the likely effects 
of climate change (Abbott, 2008: 11).  
 
Again, this Report does not envisage the adoption of extraordinary measures 
to address climate change. Moreover, the report warns that in case 
extraordinary measures are considered, such as traditional military 
strategies, these are not adequate to handle climate change. 
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While there are clear operational concerns, it must also be 
understood that if governments simply respond with traditional 
attempts to maintain the status quo and control insecurity they 
will ultimately fail. In today’s globalised world, using military force 
to secure resources overseas, while attempting to create a fortress 
state at home, will not work – despite the potential attraction of 
such policies for governments faced with such an uncertain future 
(…) In the long-term, the risks of climate change demand a 
rethink of current approaches to security and the development of 
cooperative and sustainable ways of achieving that security, with 
an emphasis on preventative rather than reactive strategies. 
(Abbott, 2008: 12) 
 
The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Report, Delivering Climate 
Security: International Security Responses to a Climate Changed World, 
focuses on the role of security actors in addressing climate change. 
According to the Report, security actors have a responsibility in “reducing the 
climate impact of their operations and activities” (Mabey, 2007: 2). 
Furthermore, it suggests that security actors should also have a responsibility 
in the development of technology to address climate change.  
 
The security sector has the vital – and expensively acquired –
experience of how government can drive technological 
development and infrastructure deployment at a similar scale to 
that needed to respond to climate change. Security actors should 
promote dramatically increased investment in the development 
and deployment of technologies critical for energy and climate 
security. (Mabey, 2007: 2-3)  
 
The Report also argues for a transformation of the security sector to deal 
with instability in strategic regions highly vulnerable to climate change and 
marked by weak governance. What is proposes is the implementation of a 
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broad conflict prevention agenda and, more importantly, a focus on the 
management of tensions over resources (Mabey, 2007: 5-6).  
 
Despite this focus on the security sector, the Report does not call for the 
adoption of exceptional measures. What is proposed is an adaptation of the 
sector to deal with the security consequences of climate change, as well as 
to contribute to curb climate change by lowering the environmental impact of 
security activities. 
 
Apart from this reflection on the security sector, the Report also argues for a 
transformation in the international industrial policies of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development countries. According to the Report 
this entails sharing advanced energy technologies and funding large scale 
investment in countries such as China and India (Mabey, 2007: 3). Moreover 
it calls for modifications in the management of climate adaptation in the 
international climate change regime (Mabey, 2007: 6). These measures are 
inserted in normal climate policy making. 
 
International Alert’s 2007 Report A Climate of Conflict: The Links Between 
Climate Change, Peace and War recommends the integration of climate 
change considerations into development and peacebuilding activities. 
According to the Report, the established principles of conflict-sensitive 
development practices should be applied to climate change policies and 
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practice as a way of preventing climate-related violent conflict (Smith and 
Vivekananda, 2007: 37). 
 
Regarding the impact of climate change on fragile states, the Report argues 
that adaptation should take priority over mitigation, as the former is the 
most pressing need. Moreover, the majority of fragile states have 
subsistence economies, contributing very little to carbon emissions. 
According to the Report, donor governments have the responsibility to 
integrate adaptation and other competences on climate change in 
development cooperation, in the framework of good governance (Smith and 
Vivekananda, 2007: 40). 
 
Rather than arguing for exceptional measures, the Report focuses on 
development aid cooperation and peacebuilding activities as measures to 
curb climate change contributions to violent conflict. What is proposed is that 
climate change considerations are integrated in existing policies, which 
means climate change would be dealt within the current policy framework. 
 
Oxfam International’s 2009 The Right to Survive: The Humanitarian 
Challenge for the Twenty-First Century, focuses on rich governments’ 
responsibility as major contributors to climate change. Accordingly, it urges 
these governments to increase their donations to humanitarian aid, take the 
lead in mitigation action by cutting global emissions and provide financial 
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assistance for poor countries adaptation to climate change (Oxfam 
International, 2009: 3). 
 
The Report identifies priorities for international action in dealing with the 
humanitarian consequences of climate change. These include strengthening 
the links between relief and development, working towards reducing 
vulnerability by using long-term instruments, investment in disaster risk-
reduction capacity and programming by international development agencies 
and the creation of a UN adaptation finance mechanism responsible for the 
oversight and delivery of funds (Oxfam International, 2009: 118). 
 
What Oxfam is arguing is that climate change adds pressure to humanitarian 
needs and therefore humanitarian assistance must take it into account. 
Corresponding transformations in humanitarian mechanisms are of course 
implied but these do not alter the established structure. 
 
Climate Change Securitization – Policy Change? 
EU action on climate change is now addressed in order to identify what 
changes securitization produced in concrete policies. EU’s action against 
climate change is based on two main strategies: 
 
Addressing climate change requires two types of response. Firstly, 
and importantly, we [EU] must reduce our greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) (i.e. take mitigation action) and secondly we 
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must take adaptation action to deal with the unavoidable impacts. 
(European Commission, 2009: 3) 
 
Since the publication of Climate Change and International Security these 
strategies were invested with a security feature. As the EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, 
puts it: “Both mitigation and adaptation should go hand in hand with 
addressing the international security threats of climate change. Both should 
also be seen as preventive security policy” (Solana, 2008). 
 
European adaptation policies’ main guidelines are found in two documents: 
the 2007 Green Paper on Adaptation to Climate Change and the 2009 White 
Paper on Adapting to Climate Change. The first, resulting from the findings 
of the European Climate Change Programme, was presented by the 
European Commission in June 2007. The document instructs EU action on 
adaptation to climate change under four main pillars, namely integrating 
adaptation in legislation, policies, and Community funding programmes 
(European Commission, 2007b: 14); integrating adaptation in EU external 
relations with developing, neighbouring and industrialised countries 
(European Commission, 2007b: 21); climate research for uncertainty 
reduction (European Commission, 2007b: 24); and participation of European 
society, business and public sector in the preparation of adaptation strategies 
(European Commission, 2007b: 26). 
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A security dimension is integrated in the third pillar of EU external relations. 
The Green paper places adaptation to climate change in third countries at 
the level of conflict prevention. 
 
EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has an important 
role to play in enhancing the EU's capacity to prevent and deal 
with conflicts such as border disputes and tensions over access to 
natural resources and natural disasters accentuated by climate 
change as well as their potential consequences such as forced 
migration and internal displacements of persons. (European 
Commission, 2007b: 21) 
 
EU’s investment in climate change adaptation in third countries becomes a 
means to avoid violent conflict, and thus maintain security.  
 
In the sequence of the consultation launched by the Green Paper, the 
Commission published in April 2009 a White Paper on adapting to climate 
change, a policy paper that launches EU’s Adaptation Framework. The paper 
previews a phased approach, in which phase 1 will lay the ground work for a 
comprehensive EU adaptation strategy from 2009 to 2012 and phase 2, 
initiating in 2013, will implement the strategy. Phase 1 comprehends four 
lines of action, namely building a solid knowledge base on the impact and 
consequences of climate change, integrating adaptation into EU key policy 
areas, employing a combination of policy instruments to ensure effective 
delivery of adaptation and stepping up international cooperation on 
adaptation (European Commission, 2009: 7). 
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As in the Green Paper, the security dimension is included in the external 
action of the EU. Regarding EU’s relations with third countries the document 
says: 
 
Failure to adapt could have security implications. The EU is 
therefore strengthening its analysis and early warning systems 
and integrating climate change into existing tools such as conflict 
prevention mechanisms and security sector reform. The effects of 
climate change on migratory flows should also be considered in 
the broader EU reflection on security, development and migration 
policies. (European Commission, 2009: 15-16) 
 
 
The Security dimension is more evident in the Commission Staff Working 
Document accompanying the White Paper, entitled Impact Assessment 
(2009). Again, in the section dedicated to the external dimension of EU’s 
adaptation measures, the security implications of climate change are 
addressed, through the inclusion of a sub-section dedicated to climate 
change’s impacts on global security (European Commission, 2009c: 112). 
The Commission recommends that adaptation is “mainstreamed” in, i.e. 
becomes a customary component of, EU's external policies, particularly 
development cooperation, security and migration (European Commission, 
2009b: 128). 
 
Despite these documents recognising of a security dimension in adaptation, 
no extraordinary measures are envisaged in any of them. There are no 
military measures defined to deal with the security implications of climate 
change, nor any radical instruments to address climate change, such as, for 
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instance, the criminalisation of greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, 
adaptation is transformed into a security strategy, raising the urgency of its 
implementation. Furthermore, it is perceptible from the documents that the 
security implications of climate change will be dealt within the realm of 
normal politics, more precisely through development aid cooperation policies. 
 
With respect to mitigation it is also important to understand the impacts 
generated by the application of a mind-set of security to climate change. In 
an opinion article for The Guardian, the EU High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, argued that “saying that 
climate change poses security risks reinforces the need to stick to our [EU’s] 
commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (Solana, 2008). Hence, 
mitigation policies can be seen as making part of a strategy to attain 
security.  
 
In this context, the EU declares to be committed to obtain a 2°C target in 
international negotiations. The 2007 communication from the European 
Commission entitled precisely Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees 
Celsius frames this target within a security concern. According to the 
document “strong scientific evidence shows that urgent action to tackle 
climate change is imperative (…) a failure to act will have serious local and 
global security implications” (European Commission, 2007b:3). 
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In order to limit climate change, the EU intends to reduce its overall 
emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020. To achieve this target, 
the EU adopted a Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package in 2008. 
The four pillars of this package of measures are promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources (European Commission, 2008c), member 
states reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s 
commitments up to 2020 (European Commission, 2008d), improvement and 
extending of the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the 
Community (European Commission, 2008e) and the development of 
geological storage of carbon dioxide (European Commission, 2008f). 
 
As with adaptation, mitigation strategies were thus transformed into security 
strategies, based on the premise that reducing emissions will reduce climate 
change and, as a consequence, reduce its security impacts. This security 
framing raises the urgency of mitigation actions, taking the EU from an 8% 
reduction target by 2012 under Kyoto to a voluntary 20% reduction target to 
be attained by 2020.  
 
Nevertheless this urgency does not translate into extraordinary measures. 
The Climate action and renewable energy package argues the proposed 
reduction target has to be attained in a “cost-effective” manner, with 
different targets between member states to guarantee fairness (European 
Commission, 2008d). Moreover, member states continue to rely on the 
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Community’s greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system. Hence, 
although a more ambitious emissions target is proposed, the mechanisms to 
accomplish it are framed within existing policies. 
 
As demonstrated previously, the EU institutions give significant importance to 
the security impacts of climate change in third countries, particularly 
developing countries. As a consequence, climate change is a declared 
intervention area in EU’s development aid cooperation policy. The EU Action 
Plan on Climate Change and Development shaped in 2003 aims at 
incorporating climate change into all aspects of EU development aid policy. 
Focusing on the links between poverty and environment, the document 
outlines four strategic priorities: raising the policy profile of climate change in 
developing countries, supporting adaptation, supporting mitigation, and 
developing capacities (European Commission, 2003: 13-19).  
 
With the objective of renewing the commitment of the Action Plan to 
systematically integrate climate change into development aid cooperation, 
the European Commission launched in 2007 the Global Climate Change 
Alliance (GCCA) between the European Union and poor developing countries 
most vulnerable to climate change. Although security concerns are not 
included in the initial Commission proposal (European Commission, 2007b), a 
subsequent communication from the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
European Parliament to the Committee on Development recommends the 
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incorporation of a security dimension in the GCCA. The Committee of Foreign 
Affairs 
 
[c]onsiders that international cooperation must be stepped up as 
regards the detection and monitoring of climate-change-related 
security threats and in respect of prevention capability, 
preparedness, alleviation and response, and that the development 
of regional security situations at the various levels of climate 
change (taking into account the implications thereof for 
international security) must be promoted. (European Parliament, 
2008: 4) 
 
Moreover, Climate Change and International Security, the joint report of the 
EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
European Commission, envisages a role for the GCCA in addressing the 
security implications of climate change in EU’s relations with third countries 
(European Commission, 2008: 11). However, the creation of such a 
mechanism as the GCCA is not an exceptional measure. Although the GCCA 
could serve security interests, it is a development aid cooperation framework 
developed and adopted as a part of normal politics. 
 
What becomes evident from the analysis of the previous documents is that 
although a discourse of security and urgency is used to address climate 
change, the strategies developed to tackle this issue and the policies adopted 
are not traditional security or exceptional environmental policy measures. In 
fact, the actions defined are adaptation and mitigation measures, with a 
commitment to climate research, along the lines of normal politics. 
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There is however a role envisaged for the military. The joint report by the EU 
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
Commission on Climate Change and International Security recommends the 
development of military instruments for crisis management and disaster 
response (European Commission, 2008: 10). And although no major policy 
change or action plan has been implemented at the EU or the member state 
level on this matter, some military organisations have recognised the need to 
incorporate climate change in their strategies. 
 
The British Ministry of Defence, for instance, adopted in 2008 a Climate 
Change Strategy which recognises that climate change may transform “the 
way in which military personnel operate, are sustained, and have to respond 
to humanitarian needs” (MOD, 2008: 10) thus imposing a need for 
adaptation. The document acknowledges a role for the British military in 
 
[u]nderstanding the impact that Climate Change will have on 
Global Security and factoring it into our [MOD] planning of force 
structure and training, as well as taking an active role in cross-
Government and International Climate Security planning. (MOD, 
2008:30) 
 
In this context, the Strategy announces that the Ministry of Defence will 
work to identify “the regions most at risk from the impacts of climate change 
and put into place measures to preserve peace and stability in these regions” 
(MOD, 2008: 10). But, while affirming its role in addressing the security 
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causes of climate change, a substantial part of the Strategy is also devoted 
to MOD’s actions to reduce its contribution to the causes of climate change. 
 
MOD is a significant contributor to the causes of climate change, 
creating about 70% of emissions from the government estate and 
about 1% of UK Carbon Dioxide (CO2) emissions. Therefore, 
reducing our emissions from our estate, our use of aviation, 
marine and ground fuels, and our business administrative travel 
will contribute to wider mitigation activities. (MOD, 2008: 4) 
 
It is also clear that institutions designed to deal with security issues are being 
called upon to deal with climate change. The joint report of the EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
Commission envisions a role in research, analysis, monitoring and early 
warning for the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC) and the EU Joint Situation Centre 
(SITCEN), the latter an intelligence centre designed to monitor crisis, 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation (European 
Commission, 2008: 9). But the main work on climate change still relies on 
environmental institutions. 
 
From the previous analysis, it becomes evident that the securitization of 
climate change did not lead to the adoption of extraordinary measures. 
Neither the securitizing actors propose such measures to address climate 
change (with exception to a couple of references to an extension of the 
Security Council mandate to include environmental issues), nor have they 
been implemented. Consequently, the securitization of climate change did 
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not create a new structure or a paradigm shift, to use Gramsci’s and Hall´s 
reasonings respectively. 
 
Although climate change is increasingly being framed as a security issue, 
both causes and effects are being dealt within the realm of normal 
environmental politics. This is to say that the mechanisms used to address 
climate change are international negotiations and international agreements. 
Emissions are not drastically cut as the Polluter Pays principle still applies, 
allowing those who can afford it to continue polluting. Moreover, the 
European greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system also permits 
that some countries continue with their level of emissions, or even increase 
it. 
 
But, even if climate change is not being dealt with extraordinary measures, 
this does not hinder its securitization. As Ralf Emmers so eloquently puts it, 
 
[a]ccording to the securitization model, transforming an issue into 
security question only requires the audience acknowledgement 
that it is indeed a threat. The adoption of extraordinary measures 
is not a requirement (…) This means that a securitizing actor can 
make successful speech acts while still deciding to address the 
existential threat through standard political procedure rather than 
extraordinary measures. (Emmers, 2007: 114) 
 
At this point, it is clear that the EU and its member states have decided to 
manage climate change through standard political procedure. This suggests 
that in the EU, rather than calling for extraordinary measures, the 
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securitization of climate change had the objective of raising awareness and 
invest climate change with a greater sense of urgency. Buzan et al. argue 
that “textual analysis suggests that something is designated as an 
international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more 
important than other and should take absolute priority” (1998: 24). The goal 
of the securitizing actors was to give climate change this priority in the 
international agenda. 
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Conclusion 
 
With the deepening and broadening of security studies, the environment has 
emerged as new security issue. In this context, climate change has 
increasingly been gaining the status of major concern at the global level, 
being gradually viewed as a threat to security. The securitization of climate 
change has entered the international agenda generating both concerns of a 
militarisation of the response to the issue and expectation of effective 
change in climate policies.  
 
In this context, this dissertation aimed at understanding the implications of 
elevating climate change to the security realm through the analysis of the 
process of securitization of climate change in the European Union. The 
Copenhagen securitization framework constitutes an essential tool in the 
understanding of how issues become security issues by putting into evidence 
the mechanisms through which issues reach the security agenda as well as 
the actors involved in the process. 
 
In the EU, two groups of securitizing actors were identified. At the 
bureaucratic and governmental levels, the European institutions, namely the 
European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union were found to be performing a security speech act regarding 
climate change. Additionally, France, Germany and the UK were identified as 
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member states pushing for the securitization of the issue. Most notably, 
climate change was pushed to the realm of security in the EU when it was 
included in the European Security Strategy and also in some member states 
national security strategies.  
 
At the non-governmental level, pressure groups and lobbyists were also 
identified as securitizing actors. Both humanitarian non-governmental 
organisations and independent research institutions connected to security 
and defence are calling for the inclusion of climate change in the security 
agenda, in spite of their different perspectives. 
 
Both the considered groups aim at securing European standards of living and 
the stability of the EU itself, referent objects that are considered to be 
threatened by the effects of climate change. The language of security used 
by these securitizing actors to frame climate change thus constitutes a 
conscious securitizing move.  
 
To evaluate the success of this securitizing move, European public opinion 
was assessed through the analysis of opinion studies and the media as actors 
capable of transmitting the audience’s level of acceptance of the securitizing 
move. Media analysis indicates that the speech act that depicts climate 
change as an existential threat has reached the European audience. The 
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media have been extensively framing climate change as a cause for violent 
conflict and insecurity, contributing to the diffusion of the securitizing move. 
 
Opinion poll indicators suggest that the European public is increasingly aware 
of the seriousness of climate change, identifying it as a severe problem 
facing Europe and the World. It also suggests a change in European 
perceptions concerning the importance and resources that should be 
allocated to deal with this issue. These findings indicate a growing 
willingness of Europeans to accept the adoption of exceptional measures 
regarding climate change, namely concerning resource allocation and policy 
prioritisation. 
 
Although climate change was considered to be a securitized issue in the EU, 
the research found that no extraordinary measures have been adopted to 
address the issue. The analysis of the major lines of climate change policy in 
the EU demonstrates that the securitization of climate change did not create 
a new structure or a paradigm shift that such measures would entail. 
Although climate change is increasingly being framed as a security issue, 
both causes and effects are being dealt within the realm of normal 
environmental politics.  
 
Using Peter A. Hall’s model of policy change, one can argue that climate 
change securitization originated a first order change in European 
104 
 
environmental policies. The overall goals were maintained, namely to reduce 
climate change, and so were the policy instruments to attain these goals. 
Only the levels of the policy instruments were modified. The framing of 
climate change as a security threat led, for instance, to higher targets for 
emission reductions and to an integration of mitigation and adaptation 
measures into development aid policies. Moreover, whereas mitigation and 
adaptation measures remain the basic policy instruments to address climate 
change, they were invested with a security feature, thus acquiring a level of 
urgency in their implementation. 
 
Hence, according to Hall, this first order change in climate policy corresponds 
to normal policymaking (Hall, 1993: 279). Therefore, extraordinary measures 
were not adopted as these would entail a paradigm shift in policymaking and 
implementation. 
 
But, even if climate change is not being dealt with extraordinary measures, it 
is argued that this does not hinder the securitization of the issue. In the 
securitization framework the adoption of extraordinary measures is not a 
requirement. What is considered essential is the audience’s approval of those 
measures. This allows the securitizing actor to decide whether to address the 
existential threat through standard political procedure or extraordinary 
measures. 
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It is clear that the EU and its member states have decided to manage climate 
change through standard political procedure. This suggests that in the EU, 
rather than calling for extraordinary measures, the securitization of climate 
change had the objective of raising awareness and invest climate change 
with a greater sense of urgency. The goal of the securitizing actors was to 
give climate change priority in the international agenda. 
 
Further research is needed to examine the reasons for which extraordinary 
measures have not been adopted. Possible explanations have to do with the 
institutional path-dependency of environmental institutions that resist this 
shift. The role of powerful economic actors also hinders the adoption of 
extraordinary measures on climate change as emission reductions would 
entail economic sacrifices. 
 
Another possible explanation has to do with the environmental resolution 
tradition of non-binding negotiations. Moreover, although the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report 
clearly shows climate change has an anthropogenic origin, a high degree of 
uncertainty and controversy still exists regarding this subject, delaying strong 
measures to deal with it.  
 
An also plausible explanation for the absence of extraordinary measures has 
to do with inadequacy of such measures for dealing with climate change 
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issues, particularly if one takes into consideration that the notion of 
extraordinary measure is still highly connoted with military measures.  
 
However, as this research puts into evidence, the issue of climate change 
challenges the established understanding that securitization inevitably leads 
to the adoption of traditional security policy measures. Hence, it is argued 
that as the securitization concept opens the possibility for non-traditional 
issues to become security issues, it is possible to say that this broadening of 
security also allows for non-traditional security measures to be adopted as a 
mean to enhance security. 
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